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Comment
In Response to Fair Employment Council of Greater
Washington, Inc. v. BMC Marketing Corp.:
Employment Testers Do Have a Leg to Stand On
Jonathan Levy
In December 1990, the Fair Employment Council of Greater
Washington ("the Council")1 tested an employment agency run
by BMC Marketing Corporation ("BMC").2 On two separate
days, the Council sent one white and one black tester, an indi-
vidual who poses as a job candidate to uncover discriminatory
practices,3 with comparable credentials to BMC.4 Although
BMC referred both white testers for employment, it did not refer
their black counterparts. 5 The black testers and the Council
sued BMC alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 ("Title VI") 6 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("§ 1981").7 In Fair
1. The Council is an organization that seeks to further equal employment
opportunity in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. Fair Employment
Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 829 F. Supp. 402, 406
(D.D.C. 1993), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 28 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In
addition to its testing program, the Council also engages in various education,
counseling, and research projects. Id.
2. Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Mktg.
Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1994) [hereinafter FEC].
3. See EEOC Notice No. N-915-062, 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 2168
(Nov. 20, 1990) [hereinafter EEOC Notice] (providing guidance as to whether
testers have standing to file charges of employment discrimination). In prac-
tice, agencies like the Council match employment testers in pairs of minority
and majority class individuals with manufactured similar characteristics and
credentials. Michelle Landever, Note, Tester Standing in Employment Discrim-
ination Cases Under42 U.S.C. § 1981,41 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 381, 383 (1993). In
the civil rights arena, organizations employ testers for litigation and research
purposes. Steven G. Anderson, Comment, Tester Standing Under Title VII: A
Rose by Any Other Name, 41 DEPAuL L. Rav. 1217, 1220 (1992).
4. FEC, 28 F.3d at 1270. The Council manufactured the testers' creden-
tials to ensure objective similarity. Id.
5. Id. Furthermore, BMC allegedly "refused even to accept an application
from one of the black testers." Id.
6. Id. Title VII provides in relevant part: "It shall be an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for em-
ployment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his
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Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Mar-
keting Corp. ("FEC"), the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals dismissed the testers' suit for lack of standing,8 and
held that the Council had standing only to the extent it could
show programmatic injury9 apart from injury to the testers.10
Although the issue of whether employment testers and their
sponsoring organizations have standing to sue has generated a
great deal of commentary,11 courts have not explicitly addressed
the issue until FEC. The Supreme Court, however, has recog-
nized standing for fair housing testers under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,12 and lower courts have conferred
standing on housing testers under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982.13
Employment-tester standing has significant ramifications
for civil rights enforcement. Minority labor force participation
has remained stagnant, while "failure-to-hire" cases under civil
rights laws have diminished.14 Tester suits target the enforce-
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1988). See
infra notes 73-86, 93 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII generally).
7. FEC, 28 F.3d at 1270. Section 1981 guarantees all citizens of the
United States "the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts... as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
8. FEC, 28 F.3d at 1270-74. See infra part II (discussing the FEC court's
holding).
9. The court defined programmatic injury as set-backs to the organiza-
tion's specific programs rather than to its abstract goal of fair employment.
FEC, 28 F.3d at 1276. See infra notes 29-32 (discussing organizational stand-
ing), 153-64 and accompanying text (discussing the FEC court's treatment of
organizational standing).
10. FEC, 28 F.3d at 1277. See infra part II (discussing the circuit court's
opinion).
11. The EEOC sparked the controversy when it published guidelines invit-
ing complaints from testers. See EEOC Notice, supra note 3, 2168. See also
infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text (discussing the EEOC's reasoning).
Proponents and critics responded in law journals and the legal press. See, e.g.,
Anderson, supra note 3, at 1262-68 (arguing that employment testers should
have standing under Title VII); Landever, supra note 3, at 392-402 (arguing
that employment testers have standing under § 1981); Michael J. Yelnosky,
Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers to Uncover and Remedy Discrimi-
nation in Hiring for Lower-skilled, Entry Level Jobs, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 403,
469-84 (1993) (arguing that the EEOC should implement a testing program);
Alex Young K. Oh, Note, Using Employment Testers To Detect Discrimination:
An Ethical And Legal Analysis, 7 GEo. J. LEGAL ETms 473, 481-96 (1991) (ar-
guing that testing is ethical).
12. See infra notes 109-12 (discussing fair housing tester standing under
Title VIII).
13. See infra notes 113-16 (discussing fair housing tester standing under
the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
14. A number of factors weigh into the relative dearth of failure-to-hire
suits. Employees have greater incentive to sue in a discriminatory discharge
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ment gap at entry-level positions and provide a mechanism for
revealing discriminatory conduct. 15
situation because they have given "time and energy to the relationship with the
employer." Yelnosky, supra note 11, at 410-15. The nature of failure-to-hire
actions also creates obstacles to success. Unsuccessful applicants probably do
not recognize, or even suspect, the discrimination. Id. Furthermore, if their job
search ultimately succeeds, victims of discrimination will have only negligible
amounts of backpay available as a remedy and little cause to question the mo-
tives of earlier rejections. Id. In the case of low-skill, entry-level jobs, the ab-
sence of a paper trail makes discrimination difficult to prove, and the small
amount of potential backpay may make it difficult to find a lawyer. Id.
Commentators also argue that the face of discrimination has changed, be-
coming more subtle and difficult to detect. Leroy D. Clark, The Future Civil
Rights Agenda: Speculation on Litigation, Legislation, and Organization, 38
CATH. U. L. REV. 795, 823 (1989); Deborah L. Rhode, Occupational Inequality
1988 DuKE L.J. 1207, 1218 (1988). See Thomas F. Pettigrew, New Patterns of
Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 673
(1985) (arguing that "severe and difficult manifestations" of racism are preva-
lent in American society); Rochelle L. Stanfield, Measuring Job Bias, 23 NAT'L
L.J. 2598, 2600 (1991) (describing a study using testers to uncover discrimina-
tion by cab drivers); PrimeTime Live: True Colors; Running in Place; Bossy Lit-
tle Thing (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 26, 1991), available in LEXIS, News
Library, Script File (reporting on results of the program's investigation using
testers in St. Louis to reveal widespread discrimination in a variety of everyday
transactions).
15. Yelnosky, supra note 11, at 410-15; Urban Institute Research Using
Testers Documents Bias Against Black Job Seekers, 1991 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 94, at A-4 (May 15, 1991) [hereinafter Urban Institute Research Using Test-
ers]. In an Urban Institute study that had 476 pairs of testers audit employers
in the Washington, D.C., and Chicago areas, the white tester progressed further
than her black counterpart in one out of every five cases. Anderson, supra note
3, at 1217 nn.1-4 (citing Urban Institute Research Using Testers, supra). The
study concluded that "unfavorable treatment of young black men is widespread
and pervasive across firms offering entry-level jobs." Id. (quoting Urban Insti-
tute Research Using Testers, supra).
Some critics point to the increasing number of employment discrimination
suits to argue that employlhent discrimination laws are overenforced. See RICH-
ARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYmENT Dis-
CRIMINATION LAws 159-81 (1992) (arguing that Title VII distorts labor
markets); John J. Donohue DI & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Em-
ployment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 983-86 (1991) (stat-
ing that between 1970 and 1989, employment discrimination case filings
multiplied by 2166% while other civil filings grew 125%, thereby leading some
Americans to believe Title Vfls "drain on business" had exceeded the utility of
the statute); see also James R. Kluegel & Eliot R. Smith, Whites' Beliefs About
Blacks' Opportunity, 47 AM. Soc. REv. 518, 518 (1982) (arguing that many
whites believe that opportunities for minorities have become equal).
Discriminatory firing cases, however, constitute the bulk of Title VII litiga-
tion today. Donohue & Siegelman, supra, at 984, 1015; see Minna J. Kotkin,
Public Remedies for Private Wrongs: Rethinking the Title VII Back Pay Rem-
edy, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1301, 1346-47 (1990) (finding that between 1974 and
1985, failure to hire charges decreased from 12% of all charges filed with the
EEOC to 6% while discriminatory firing charges increased from 23% to 37%);
1995]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
This Comment contends that testers should have standing
to sue under both Title VII and § 1981. Part I explores the doc-
trine of standing in general and as applied in the civil rights
context. Part 11 discusses the FEC court's reasoning in denying
tester standing and significantly limiting the sponsoring organi-
zation's standing. Part I argues that the FEC court miscon-
strued the requirements of standing by defining the rights at
stake too narrowly and the standing requirements too strin-
gently. This Comment concludes that FEC represents an unfor-
tunate trend whereby courts displace the public nature of civil
rights laws with analyses traditionally reserved for private
litigation.
I. STANDING: DEFINING TUE COURT'S ROLE IN THE
MODERN STATE
A. THE STANDING DocTRINE
Standing is one component of justiciability.16 The standing
doctrine has two components, one constitutional and the other
prudential, which serve to delimit the cases and plaintiffs that
courts will hear. The constitutional component, derived from
Article I, ensures that courts have a real, live "case or contro-
versy"17 before them.' 8 To pass constitutional muster, a plain-
tiff must allege that she has sustained, or is "likely" to sustain,19
an injury-in-fact,20 that such injury is causally connected to acts
Yelnosky, supra note 11, at 195 ("Title VII now is used predominantly to protect
the existing positions of incumbent workers.").
16. Jusiticiability defines the proper cases for consideration by the courts.
DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw 1045-54 (1993). Other compo-
nents of justiciability include the political questions doctrine, Goldwater v.
Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-06 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring), the prohibi-
tion of advisory opinions, Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356-63
(1911), and ripeness and mootness, FARBER, supra, at 1047-53.
17. Article III provides that the 'judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity" and to certain "Controversies." U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2.
18. In essence, the case or controversy requirement ensures that the par-
ties hold a sufficient interest in the issue for the adversarial system to function,
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-101 (1968), and to warrant the interest of the
court, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
19. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136-40 (1992); City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-05 (1983); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 617 (1973).
20. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Association of Data Process-
ing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151-54 (1970). See infra notes 35-
59 and accompanying text (describing injury-in-fact jurisprudence).
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of the defendant, and that it is redressable by the courts. 21
These requirements represent an "irreducible minimum" of facts
that a plaintiff must allege to obtain standing under Article
If. 2 2
The prudential component assures that courts have the
"proper"23 or "best" plaintiff before them.24 This component con-
sists of rules adopted for the court's self-governance.25 For in-
stance, courts normally will not entertain suits where a
plaintiff's injury resulted from the violation of a third-party's
rights.26 Congress, however, may override prudential rules by a
statutory grant of standing.27 Furthermore, where "counter-
vailing considerations" outweigh the policies behind prudential
rules, courts, in effect, infer that Congress intended to confer a
cause of action.28
Because the Supreme Court has recognized only "program-
matic" injuries to organizations,2 9 the law puts an organization
in no better position than an individual to assert "generalized
grievances"30 or setbacks to its abstract goals.31 Thus, the chal-
lenged conduct must "perceptibly impair" an organization's spe-
21. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 36-46 (1976);
Warth, 422 U.S. at 498-502; Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 616-18.
22. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); see Warth, 422 U.S. at 498
(stating that constitutional barriers are a 'threshold question in every federal
case").
23. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968).
24. Prudential barriers seek "to limit access to the federal courts to those
litigants best suited to assert a particular claim." Gladstone, Realtors v. Village
of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979).
25. Warth, 422 U.S. at 509.
26. That is, plaintiffs ordinarily will be allowed to assert only a violation of
their own rights. Id. at 499. But see infra notes 60-69 (discussing exceptions to
the presumption against third-party standing).
27. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (cit-
ing Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971)). The Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, for instance, grants judicial review to "any person
claiming to be aggrieved under a relevant statute." Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (Supp. IV 1964)). See infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text (describ-
ing grant of standing in Title VII).
28. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.
29. See id. at 499 (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 602, 634 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974)).
Nor may an organization assert "abstract questions" that are "of wide public
significance." Id. at 499-500.
30. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982).
31. Id. at 378-79. Thus, analysis of organizational standing does not differ
from individual standing: the organization must allege a "concrete and demon-
strable injury." Id. at 379.
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cific activities before a court will grant the organization
standing.32
Although grounded in seemingly settled principles, stand-
ing remains one of the more confusing and roundly criticized fac-
ets of modern Supreme Court jurisprudence.3 3 Critics argue
that the Court manipulates standing barriers with no explicit
rhyme or reason.3 4
32. Id.
33. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) ( [Tlhe concept of 'Art. H
standing' has not been defined with complete consistency."); United Steelwork-
ers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219-55 (1979) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (labeling the Court's opinion Orwellian due to its
"unremarked switch" in interpreting Title VII); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129
(1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing standing as "a word game played by
secret rules").
34. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223,
250-51 (1988) (urging the abandonment of traditional, incoherent standing doc-
trine); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAiF. L. REv. 68, 68-69
(1984) (arguing the Court's application is erratic and unfocused); Mark V.
Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CoRmLL L.
REV. 663, 663 (1977) (claiming "the law of standing lacks a rational concep-
tional framework"); see Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term - Fore-
word: Public Law Litigation and The Burger Court, 96 HARv. L. REv. 4, 22-23
(1982) (describing standing doctrine as a litany that the court recites before it
"chooses up sides").
Commentators have argued, further, that beneath the apparent lawless-
ness, courts use the standing doctrine to serve a variety of purposes beyond its
scope. See, e.g., Nichol, supra, at 78-84. For instance, some have asserted that
courts employ standing as a means of docket maintenance, of avoiding difficult
issues, especially political questions, and of dismissing cases to which the judge
is hostile without reaching the merits. Fletcher, supra, at 228 (docket mainte-
nance); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-
Governance, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1371, 1373 (1988) (avoiding difficult questions
and merits); Nichol, supra, at 98-101 (avoiding political questions); Tushnet,
supra, at 663-64 (avoiding difficult questions and merits); Scott A. Powell, Com-
ment, Global Protection of Threatened and Endangered Species: Rethinking
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 31 WILLAmTE L. REv. 523,544 (1995)
(avoiding difficult questions); Tony E. Monzingo, Note, I Think That I Shall
Never See, Standing for a Tree; or Has the Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife Deci-
sion Spelled Doom for Extraterritorial Environmental Standing, 10 Aiz. J.
INr'L & Comp. L. 431, 438 (1993) (avoiding political questions).
Positive suggestions range from simple pleas for honesty to scrapping the
modern framework altogether. Fletcher, supra, at 223, 250-51 (arguing to
abandon the modern standing doctrine); Nichol, supra, at 70 ("If such factors
are to be introduced into the standing calculus they should be addressed openly
and individually."); Tushnet, supra, at 700 (arguing to abandon the modem
standing doctrine).
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1. Cognizable Injury: Mediating Public and Private Notions
of Harm
Standing evolved in response to the modern administrative
state.3 5 Citizen challenges to state action represented a new
model of litigation, resting on public harms and seeking public
remedies.3 6 As public actions became more common, courts
struggled to define the kinds of intangible or non-economic inju-
ries deemed justiciable. 37
The modern doctrine of standing emerged in the 1970s as
the Supreme Court sought to insulate the standing inquiry from
the merits of the claim.38 The modern doctrine constituted a
progressive change from the public litigation perspective be-
cause the traditional doctrine impeded novel claims by requiring
the legal recognition of the plaintiff's allegedly infringed inter-
35. E.g., Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 178 (1970) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 111 (Douglas, J.,
concurring) and noting the "growing complexities of government" and that
courts often provide the "only place" where relief can be obtained); Association
of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970) ("[T]he
trend is toward enlargement of the class of people who may protest administra-
tive action."). Standing did not emerge as a doctrine until the 1930s, when
courts began to recognize circumstances where broad judicial review for indi-
viduals acting as "private attorneys general" was appropriate. See, e.g., Froth-
ingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923) (describing the plaintiff's interest
as a taxpayer "indeterminable," the Court dismissed the case without explicitly
relying on standing); Associated Indus. of N.Y. State v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704(2d. Cir. 1943) (recognizing congressional grant of a private cause of action to
prevent violation of government official's authority); see also Fletcher, supra
note 34, at 224-28 (discussing the origins of modern standing).
36. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organ., 426 U.S. 26
(1975) (challenge by indigents to Internal Revenue Service policies governing
charitable tax status of hospitals); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 614-
15 (1973) (class action alleging "discriminatory application" of child support
laws); Mast, 392 U.S. at 88 (taxpayer challenge to federal expenditures for pa-
rochial schools allegedly in violation of Establishment Clause); see also Chayes,
supra note 34, at 56-60 (arguing that public model litigation grows in spite ofjudicial hostility); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litiga-
tion, 89 HARv. L. REy. 1281, 1285-1304 (1976) (describing public and private
models of litigation).
37. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153-54 (rejecting
legal interest because it "goes to the merits" and does not adequately address
non-economic issues); see also Nichol, supra note 34, at 74 (arguing that the
Association of Data Processing court sought to broaden judicial access).
38. Association of Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153; Nichol, supra note 34,
at 74-75 & 74 nn.36-37.
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est.3 9 Initially, the modern doctrine simply required that an al-
leged injury be "distinct" or "palpable."40
The Court has since indicated that a distinct or palpable in-
jury must be "cognizable" under the law invoked.41 Conse-
quently, a tension has emerged in the cases under the rubric of
distinct and palpable injury that reflects judicial wavering as to
the appropriateness of public litigation.
One line of cases extends standing to a seemingly broad
range of intangible injuries.42 In United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures ("SCRAP"),43 for
instance, a student group had standing based on harm to "envi-
ronmental and aesthetic values."4 The SCRAP plaintiffs chal-
lenged regulatory approval of a freight surcharge on the theory
39. In Association ofData Processing, which inaugurated modern standing
doctrine, the Court reconsidered the Administrative Procedure Act's grant of
judicial review to "a person 'aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute.'" 397 U.S. at 153 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. IV 1964)).
The Court rejected the traditional "legal interests test." Id. Under Association
of Data Processing, a plaintiff must allege an injury in fact that arguably falls
"within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or con-
stitutional guarantee in question." Id. The Court abandoned its traditional ap-
proach in part because it found the test's essential conservatism inappropriate
in an era where citizen challenges to a growing bureaucracy have become com-
mon. See id. at 154 (emphasizing that non-economic values are cognizable);
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 168-78 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (arguing that standing inquiries have become confused).
40. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
41. See International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tu-
lane Educ. Fund, 111 S.Ct. 1700, 1704 (1991) (citing with approval Fletcher,
supra note 34, at 231-34 (arguing that standing simply cannot be non-norma-
tive as to the legal merits because every plaintiff who does not lie has sustained
an injury)); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (stating that standing
decision requires "examination" of whether plaintiff "is entitled to an adjudica-
tion of the particular claims asserted").
42. These cases typically emerge from the Warren Court. See, e.g., Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 91-106 (1968) (granting standing to a taxpayer challenging
federal expenditures on parochial schools allegedly in violation of the Establish-
ment Clause); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204-08 (1962) (granting standing to
challenge reapportionment on basis of alleged vote-dilution). The Burger
Court, however, also recognized intangible injuries. See, e.g., Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280 n.14 (1978) (granting standing to
white medical school applicant on ground that affirmative action program pre-
cluded him from competing for all available places); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 81 (1978) (granting residents near nuclear
facility standing to challenge congressional limitations on nuclear accident
liability).
43. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures,
412 U.S. 669 (1973) [hereinafter SCRAP].
44. Id. at 683-90 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,734 (1972)).
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that it would discourage recycling and thus harm environmental
resources the students enjoyed. 45
Another line of cases, however, calls for judicial restraint.46
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,47 for example, the Supreme
Court denied standing to plaintiffs challenging foreign develop-
ment policy48 because no actual or "imminent" threat of injury to
the plaintiffs existed.49 Although the challenged dam project al-
legedly posed an immediate threat to endangered species, the
plaintiffs' failure to allege a present intention to visit the im-
pacted area defeated standing.50
Although these two lines of cases appear to conflict irrecon-
cilably,51 one possible explanation posits that the Supreme
45. Id. at 678-83.
46. These cases typically originate with the Burger and Rehnquist courts.
See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215-18
(1974) (holding the Incompatibility Clause does not confer standing to challenge
the presence of reservists in congress); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166, 171-80 (1974) (holding interference with a citizen's ability to be an in-
formed elector insufficient injury to challenge the secrecy of the CIA's budget);
cf Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organ., 426 U.S. 26, 39-46 (1976)
(holding as insufficient, the causal relationship between indigents' access to
health care and regulations defining amount of pro bono care requisite for hos-
pital's charitable tax status); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 614-18
(1973) (holding that an injunction requiring a district attorney to prosecute de-
linquent fathers would not redress plaintiff's alleged deprivation of child
support).
47. 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992).
48. In Lujan, plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring the Secretary of the
Interior to apply the Endangered Species Act to government conduct outside
the United States. Id. at 2135.
49. Id. at 2137-40.
50. Thus, there was no "imminent" danger that the dam project would deny
the plaintiffs the opportunity to observe the threatened species. Id. The Court
rejected the theory that because the plaintiffs could simply purchase airplane
tickets and return to the affected countries in the near future, the Court could
presume the likelihood of injury. Id. at 2138 n.2. Moreover the Court dis-
missed theories based on the plaintiffs' personal or professional interest in the
endangered species or an "ecosystem nexus" theory, arguing that the repercus-
sions of environmental harm produced cognizable injuries in "contiguous eco-
systems." Id at 2139-40. The Court dismissed such theories as "academic
exercises in the conceivable." Id. (quoting SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688). But see
SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 683-90 (granting a broad basis of standing to an environ-
mental group).
51. Compare Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2133-38 with SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 686.
Despite the different outcomes, SCRAP and Lujan involved similar underlying
claims. Indeed, the dissent in Lujan argued that the Court bordered on reviv-
ing old form pleading that required exacting specificity. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at
2151-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Court in SCRAP could just as easily
have held the plaintiffs' injuries lacked sufficient immediacy. Although the
Court found the challenged rate hike imminent, the injury itself, adverse effect
on aesthetic resources, appeared rather attenuated. See supra text accompany-
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Court in the 1980s embraced the view that the standing doctrine
primarily serves to preserve federalism and the separation of
powers by preventing the federal judiciary from encroaching on
the states and the other branches of government. 52 Thus, under
a separation of powers analysis, the Lujan plaintiffs' request for
the Court to scrutinize foreign policy, a traditional executive
function, distinguished them from the SCRAP plaintiffs. 53
ing notes 43-45 (discussing SCRAP). Similarly, inLujan, the injury of eliminat-
ing resources valuable to the plaintiffs appeared quite imminent, although the
effect on the plaintiffs seemed distant. See supra note 34 (citing commentators
who have attempted to reconcile Supreme Court standing jurisprudence). The
different laws invoked in each respective case did not produce the disparate
outcomes because the Endangered Species Act, in an unprecedented grant of
standing, purports to empower any individual to bring suit to enforce its provi-
sions. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994).
52. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984) (explaining constitutional
barriers must be interpreted in light of separation of powers principles). In Al-
len v. Wright, parents of black children attending public schools brought a na-
tionwide class action alleging Internal Revenue Service procedure allowed
racially exclusive private schools to retain their tax-exempt status illegally. Id.
at 739. Plaintiffs claimed, essentially, that the IRS policy abetted discrimina-
tory private schools, thus limiting childrens ability to obtain an integrated edu-
cation. Id. at 739-40. Although plaintiffs alleged cognizable injuries, the Court
denied standing under the causation prong. Id. at 756-61. The Court found
speculative any effect a change in IRS procedure would make on private school
behavior or the racial composition of public schools. Id. The Court explicitly
evaluated the plaintiffs' causation allegations in light of the knowledge that to
recognize standing would require permanent judicial monitoring of the wisdom
of internal executive affairs. Id. at 759-61 & 761 n.26. Allen v. Wright marked
the first time the Court specifically invoked separation of powers as an overrid-
ing standing consideration.
The courts, however, have consistently understood separation of powers
values to underlie standing principles. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
498 (1978) (stating standing is based on a "concern about the proper-and prop-
erly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society); Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976) (stating the Court must keep to "its
assigned role in our system"); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208,222 (1974) (explaining that standing protects against distortion of
"the role of the Judiciary in its relationship to the Executive and the Legisla-
ture"); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (arguing that the
supervision of government belongs with representatives responsible to constitu-
ents, not the judiciary); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (urging it is not
the role of the judiciary to review executive action unless unlawful governmen-
tal action poses an actual immediate threat).
Further, such values have arguably influenced standing decisions. See,
e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133
U. PA .L. REV. 635, 649-58 (1985) (arguing unspoken application of separation
of powers and federalism policies has distorted standing doctrine).
53. See Symposium, Group Discussion on the Supreme Court's Recent Ad-
ministrative Jurisprudence, 7 AnzIN. L.J. AM. U. 287, 291-93 (1993) (stating
Lujan is a separation of powers opinion); Craig R. Gottlieb, Comment, How
Standing Has Fallen: The Need to Separate Constitutional and Prudential Con-
132 [Vol. 80:123
EMPLOYMENT TESTERS
This potential reconciliation receives support from City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons,54 where federalism concerns influenced
the court's analysis. The Supreme Court apparently based its
denial of standing on its view that "local authorities" provided a
more appropriate forum.55 Lyons alleged that Los Angeles po-
lice officers had unjustifiably subjected him to a dangerous
chokehold.56 Emphasizing that Lyons's injuries sustained a suit
for damages, the court held that Lyons lacked standing to pur-
sue an injunction prohibiting the use of the hold.57 The Court
cerns, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1063, 1065, 1105-12 (1994) (recognizing Lujan raised
issues impacting international relations); Donald Stern Higley H, Note, A
Slash-and-Burn Expedition Through the Law of Environmental Standing: Lu-
jan v. Defenders of Wildlife, CAMPBELL L. REV. 347, 368-69 (1993) (arguing Lu-
jan is a separation of powers case).
54. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
55. Id. In dicta, the Court asserted that federalism "should inform" a fed-
eral court's decision "when asked to oversee state law enforcement authorities."
Id. Moreover, the Court noted that a "major civic controversy" had arisen over
the chokehold. Id. at 111-12 n.10. Given the Court's constricted reading of Ly-
ons's complaint and hyperbolic statement on the likelihood of future injury, it
appears that the Court's standing analysis was motivated by their reluctance to
interfere with the operations of local police. See infra notes 56-59 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the Court's standing analysis in Lyons). Additionally,
the authorities cited by the Court throughout Lyons originate in cases challeng-
ing local government conduct. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-04 (citing O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974)) (concerning plaintiffs alleging that police had
subjected them to discriminatory enforcement of the criminal law); Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (concerning plaintiffs alleging widespread police
misconduct aimed at minority citizens and against city residents in general));
see also Laura L. Little, It's About Time: Unraveling Standing and Equitable
Ripeness, 41 BuFF. L. REV. 933, 966 (1993) (arguing that federalism influenced
the Court's decision in Lyons); Suzanna Sherry, Issue Manipulation by the Bur-
ger Court: Saving the Community from Itself, 70 Mnm. L. REv. 611, 626-29
(1986) (same).
56. Id. at 114-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting). After stopping Lyons for driv-
ing a car with a burnt-out taillight, the police ordered him out of his vehicle and
frisked him. Id. at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Apparently without provoca-
tion, one officer began to choke Lyons by applying a forearm against his throat.
Id. at 115 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The officer choked Lyons until he blacked
out; when he came to, "he was lying face down on the ground, choking, gasping
for air, and spitting up blood and dirt." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). The po-
lice released him after issuing him a traffic citation. Id. (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
At least 16 people, including twelve African-American men, died after Los
Angeles police officers had placed them in chokeholds during the time period
between 1975 and the Lyons decision in 1983. Id. at 115-16 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). Criticisms of the Los Angeles Police Department's relations with the
minority community remain prevalent today. See, e.g., GRAND PUBA, Soul Con-
troller, on REEL TO REEL (Elektra Records 1992) ("[Clheck out the thing that
they did to Rodney King; goes to show ya, who controls ya [sic].").
57. Id. at 106 n.7, 111-12. Thus, Lyons establishes that a plaintiff must
have an independent basis for standing on each form of relief sought. The
1995]
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found that the future use of the hold was not 6ufficiently immi-
nent to provide Lyons standing unless he alleged that the police
employed a policy to "choke any citizen whom [officers] happen
to ... encounter."58 The dissent objected, finding that Lyons's
allegation that the police had choked him pursuant to depart-
mental policy met this standard.59
2. Limiting Third Party Standing Absent Countervailing
Considerations
The question of whether a litigant may assert the rights of
third parties essentially reframes the cognizable injury require-
ment.60 The prudential rule against third-party standing rests
on the reasoning that rightholders represent the most assertive
advocates of their rights.61 Barring claims of indirect victims
Court emphasized the availability of damages under its holding that equity
bars Lyons suit. Id. Although the Court found that while the police may have
illegally choked him on October 6, 1976, thus presumably affording him stand-
ing to claim damages against the individual officers and perhaps against the
city, Lyons did not establish a real or immediate threat that a Los Angeles po-
lice officer would subject him to another unprovoked, injury-causing chokehold.
Id. at 105-07.
58. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106. Indeed, the Court stated that Lyons would not
have standing unless he alleged that all Los Angeles police officers always
choke every citizen they encounter whether for the purpose of arrest, issuing a
citation, or questioning. Id. Taken at face value, these standards require plain-
tiffs to establish a virtual certainty that the threatened injury is imminent.
This statement is probably hyperbolic, however, because elsewhere the Court
talks simply of likelihood. Id. at 104.
59. Id. at 120-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that Lyons alleged that
the police choked him without provocation pursuant to official policy despite the
conclusion by the majority that Lyons had not alleged a policy of choking with-
out provocation). The dissent objected vehemently to this revival of code plead-
ing. Id.; cf. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2151-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the majority's reading of the complaint revived code pleading).
60. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-500 (1975) (stating that the
Court bases both constitutional and prudential barriers on its concern about
the role of the courts). Whereas the constitutional barriers limit exercise ofju-
dicial power to actual controversies between the litigants, prudential barriers
limit the judicial power by excluding cases of "wide public significance," where
other governmental institutions exercise greater competency and individual
rights are not at stake. Id. at 500. At least one commentator has argued that
third party standing is "not conceptually different from" ordinary standing.
Fletcher, supra note 34, at 244 (asserting that the issue as a matter of law in
both situations is whether the plaintiff has the right to enforce the legal duty in
question).
61. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("Third
parties themselves usually will be the best proponents of their own rights.")
(citing Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 397 (1898) (finding that assertion of third
parties' rights would come with "greater cogency" from the third parties
themselves)).
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enables courts to evade "abstract questions" and "generalized
grievance[s]" better addressed by other institutions.62
The Supreme Court has delineated several factors relevant
to whether a litigant may assert the rights of third parties:63
potential "obstacles" preventing suit by the third party,64 the
closeness of the relationship between the litigant and the third
party,65 and the alignment of interests between the litigant and
the third party. 66 The Court, however, has inconsistently ap-
plied these factors. 67 In effect, the Court has merged the rela-
tionship and alignment-of-interests analyses 68 and left unclear
62. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500.
63. As a prudential rule, third party jurisprudence seeks to ensure the
"best suited" litigant. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (discussing
the prudential components best plaintiff rule). The Supreme Court has stated
that the presumption against third party standing "like any general rule...
should not be applied where its underlying justifications are absent." Single-
ton, 428 U.S. at 114 (plurality opinion). In Singleton, the Court explained that
the relationship between the plaintiff and the third party should reflect that the
plaintiff represents as astute a proponent as the third party. Id. at 114-15 (plu-
rality opinion). Likewise, where obstacles to suit by the third party exist, the
third party's absence no longer implies that her right is unimportant or not at
stake, and the court views the plaintiff as the "best available proponent." Id. at
115-16 (plurality opinion).
64. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3
(1989); NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958). The
requisite pronouncement of the obstacle to suit remains unclear. See Powers v.
Ohio 499 U.S. 400, 414-15 (1991) (describing "daunting" barriers to suit by ju-
ror excluded on the basis of race); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953)
(stating that the court requires a "difficult if not impossible" obstacle). In Sin-
gleton, the Court allowed two physicians to assert the rights of indigent women
denied public funding for abortion. 428 U.S. at 108 (plurality opinion). The
plurality noted that the desire for privacy might chill potential litigants and
that imminent mootness presented an additional difficulty. Id. at 117 (plurality
opinion). The Court also recognized that the use of pseudonyms, the "capable of
repetition yet evading review" doctrine, or a class action could surmount these
obstacles but reasoned there was "little loss in terms of effective advocacy" in
allowing suit by the physician. Id. (plurality opinion). Justice Powell objected
that case law demanded that the obstacles present a practicable impossibility.
Id. at 126 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The plurality
responded by noting possible alternatives in cases where courts granted third
party standing and reasoning that such alternatives "differed only in the degree
of difficulty." Id. at 116 n.6 (plurality opinion).
65. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 623 n.3.
66. Id.
67. See Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742, 749-50 (3d. Cir. 1991); see also
Fletcher, supra note 34, at 243 (describing the "apparent lawlessness of so-
called third party standing").
68. Compare Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 623 n.3. (discussing all three
factors) with Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. at 413-14 (discussing the alignment-of-
interests under the rubric of the closeness of the relationship). See also Amato,
952 F.2d at 749 n.7 (concluding that the "closeness of the relationship" factor
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whether the factors should have independent thresholds or
whether courts should balance the showing of each factor. 69
B. STANDING AND CIVIL RIGHTs LEGISLATION
Because standing depends on whether the alleged injuries
are cognizable under the law invoked, an understanding of the
essentials of employment discrimination jurisprudence is a ne-
cessity. Furthermore, opposing views of discrimination and its
remedies mirror the tension between private and public litiga-
tion models in standing jurisprudence. In one view, discrimina-
tion lingers as a pervasive and public problem.70 In the other
encompasses both its own nature and the alignment-of-interests in the specific
litigation).
69. Id. at 749. In Caplin & Drysdale, the Court suggests that courts should
balance the relevant factors. 491 U.S. at 623 n.3. Powers, however, contains
language indicating that both obstacles and a close relationship are mandatory
for third-party standing. 499 U.S. at 411. The Court has made a number of
ambiguous pronouncements on the balancing versus prerequisite question. In
Singleton v. Wulff, the Court stated, "Even where the relationship is close, the
reasons for requiring persons to assert their own rights will generally still ap-
ply." 428 U.S. 106, 116 (1976) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added); see also
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 500-01 (1975) (stating that "countervailing consid-
erations may outweigh" the policies supporting prudential barriers); Secretary
of State of Md. v. Munson, 467 U.S. 947, 957 (1984) (stating that the absence of
an obstacle "might defeat a party's standing" in cases outside the First Amend-
ment arena); Fowler v. McCrory Corp., 727 F. Supp. 228, 233 (D. Md. 1989)
(stating that relevant factors include "concreteness of the claimed injury" and
the degree to which granting the third party standing can vindicate the policies
underlying the statute allegedly violated by the defendant).
The Court's third-party standing analysis shifts according to context. In
First Amendment overbreadth challenges, for instance, the Court found that
the danger of chilling speech justifies putting aside the obstacle factor. Mun-
son, 467 U.S. at 957. In cases involving attorney-client or doctor-patient rela-
tionships, the Court has allowed third party standing without requiring the
showing of an obstacle. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 623-24. Similarly,
"vendors and those in like positions have been uniformly permitted to resist
efforts at restricting their operations by acting as advocates of the rights of
third parties who seek access to their market or function." Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 195 (1976).
The Third Circuit, responding to these seemingly inconsistent strains in
the Supreme Court's third-party standing decisions, adopted a balancing ap-
proach. Amato, 952 F.2d at 750. The court reasoned that balancing "has the
virtue of incorporating the strength of the showings on each factor." Id. The
court further explained that because obstacles to suit come in many sizes, as do
potential conflicts of interest between plaintiffs and third parties, a balancing
approach provides the best inquiry to ascertain the appropriateness of stand-
ing. Id.
70. See supra notes 14-15 (discussing commentators views of
discrimination).
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view, it has become largely a concern of the past-thought of as
isolated, essentially private incidents.71
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964,72 the touch-
stone of employment discrimination legislation, in the midst of a
national crisis.73 Congress imbued Title VII of the Act with a
far-reaching public dimension, intending to eradicate discrimi-
natory practices in the workplace.7 4 Thus, as originally enacted,
Title VII's remedies were strictly equitable, using injunctive re-
71. See supra notes 14-15 (same).
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2000e (1994).
73. Cheryl Krause Zemelman, Note, The After-acquired Evidence Defense
to Employment Claims: The Privatization of Title VII and the Contours of So-
cial Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REV. 175, 189 (1993). Congress acted in an at-
mosphere of widespread, and at times violert, discontent. Mary L. Dudziak,
Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 62-63 (1988) (ex-
plaining that the contradiction between American race-relation ideology and
practice led to foreign policy difficulties with countries in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America in the years following World War II). Congress also believed
that racial employment discrimination limited national economic productivity.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973); H.R. REP. No.
914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 28 (1963).
Congress overcame many barriers in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Indeed, passage of strong civil rights legislation took 20 years: "Between 1943
and 1963, bills were introduced in each house of each Congress to regulate or at
least to conciliate matters involving alleged discrimination for reasons involv-
ing race, creed, color, religion, sex, age or national origin." BuREAu OF NA-
TIONAL AFFAiRS, THE CVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 18 (1964) [hereinafter BNA].
The death of President Kennedy played an instrumental role in the Act's even-
tual passage because it became part of Kennedy's legacy in both a moral and a
political sense. CHARLES W. WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DE-
BATE: A LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTs ACT 235 (1985).
Although many thought Kennedy would ultimately have compromised on the
legislation, the passage of a strong bill became imperative for President John-
son. Id. Some abnormally truncated congressional procedures ushered the bill
past its opponents. BNA, supra, at 22. The Act also had to overcome a record
filibuster. Id. at 21; WHALEN & WHALEN, supra, at 124-217. For a detailed de-
scription of the torturous route the Civil Rights Act of 1964 took to passage, see
WHALEN & WHALEN, supra, at 29-229.
74. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971) (find-
ing that Congress intended Title VII to remove discriminatory barriers to em-
ployment); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800-01 (noting that Congress's
purpose in enacting Title VII was to "eliminate those discriminatory practices
and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments" and to
"tolerate[ ] no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise"); H.R. REP. No. 914,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 18 (1963) (explaining that Title VII aims to "pro-
hibit discrimination in employment"); 110 CONG. Rlc. 2563 (1964) (statement of
Rep. Roosevelt) ("We are trying to get rid of discrimination in our national
life."); 110 CONG. REC. 1593 (1964) (statement of Rep. Cohelan) (explaining that
the bill would aid the nation's struggle for justice and equality); Id. at 1592
(statement of Rep. Corman) ("The opponents of this measure are accurate when
they label it the most far reaching civil rights bill to ever come before this
House."); 110 CONG. REc. 7212-13 (1964) (interpretive memorandum of Title
1995]
138 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:123
lief to open doors for minorities.7 5 Moreover, Congress created
the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission ("EEOC") to
mediate disputes and facilitate systemic changes in employment
practices.76
Title VII prohibits purposeful discrimination 77 on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 78 The Supreme
Court has articulated a series of burdens and presumptions that
operate to ascertain the employers' intent regarding a chal-
lenged employment decision.79
VII by Senators Clark and Case, the bill's floor managers) (defining discrimina-
tion broadly).
75. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-31. "What is required by Congress is the re-
moval of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other im-
permissible classification." Id. at 431.
76. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 705, 78 Stat.
241, 258 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994)); see also Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 8(d)-(f), 86 Stat. 103, 109-
10 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994)) (expanding powers of EEOC).
77. Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978). The
Title VII plaintiff may prosecute her case under two theories, disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact. The disparate impact theory challenges practices
which, regardless of employer intent, discriminate against protected classes in
practice. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
Suits brought by testers follow the disparate treatment approach. The gra-
vamen of this approach is intentional discrimination. Lower courts initially in-
terpreted the standard broadly to include purposeful maintenance of a policy
that discriminates. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791,796 (4th
Cir. 1971) (holding that Title VII does not require intent to discriminate); Local
189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 996-
97 (5th Cir. 1969) (same), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). Today, however,
the linchpin of the disparate treatment theory is that the employer intention-
ally treated the plaintiff differently on the basis of a protected characteristic.
Furnco Construction Corp., 438 U.S. at 577 (1978).
78. Title VII prohibits the failure or refusal to hire any individual, the dis-
charge of any individual, or the limitation, segregation, and classification of any
individual on one of the proscribed bases. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (1994).
Essentially, the same prohibitions apply to employment agencies and labor or-
ganizations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b), (c) (1994). After exhausting certain ad-
ministrative remedies, "a person claiming to be aggrieved" may bring suit in
federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994).
79. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981) (stating that a defendant can rebut a prima facie case by articulating a
legitimate reason for its employment decision, in which case plaintiff must
show pretext, or actual intent, to prevail); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802
(defining a prima facie case under Title VII). The Court has recently affirmed
the principle that the inquiry must focus on the employer's motivation at the
time the employer made the employment decision. McKennon v. Nashville
Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 885 (1994); see also infra note 81 and
accompanying text (discussing private attorney general model); infra notes 83-
85 and accompanying text (discussing judicial narrowing of Title VII).
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The Supreme Court initially recognized the broad scope of
Title VI 80 and congressional intent that Title VII plaintiffs act
as private attorneys general to vindicate congressional policy
along with individual grievances. 8' Over time, however, courts
have taken an increasingly restrictive view of Title V]1 8 2 by first
placing restrictions on class actions8 3 and ultimately character-
izing violations as analogous to torts.8 4 Congress has responded
80. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30 (stating that Title VIrs purpose is to remove
discriminatory barriers); see also EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77 (1984)
(stating that Title VII aims "to root out employment discrimination"); Arizona
Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation Plans v.
Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1103 (1983) (stating that Title VII aims "broadly to pro-
scribe discrimination in employment practices").
81. EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 595-96 (1981)
(describing the process of bringing a Title VII claim and the EEOC's handling of
that claim); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974) (describ-
ing private individuals' "significant role in the enforcement process of Title
VII); Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per
curiam); Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 850 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (stating that Congress
intended Title VII as a "spur or catalyst" to employers to eliminate the "last
vestiges" of discrimination). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the pri-
vate attorney general model. See McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 884-85 (finding that
a private litigant who seeks redress vindicates the objectives of Title VIE).
82. See, e.g., Title VII at 20, 1985 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) No. 83, at 1
(Oct. 18, 1985) (In 1977, a "new era" began "in which plaintiffs were far less
certain of victory."); Zemelman, supra note 73, at 195 & n.158 (stating that the
Supreme Court made it more difficult to bring disparate impact suits in the
1970s and 1980s).
83. Courts initially granted class certification liberally on the theory that
"race discrimination is by definition class discrimination." Hall v. Werthan Bag
Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966). In time, however, courts cur-
tailed class actions by rejecting the across-the-board method and requiring all
class actions to fit the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See General Tele. Co. of the S.W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156-57
(1982) (rejecting the across-the-board approach by holding that all class mem-
bers must have suffered the same injury, have common questions of law, and
have the same litigation interests); East Tex. Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez
431 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1977) (rejecting the across-the-board approach because
mere allegation of racial or ethnic discrimination does not satisfy class action
requirements); see Zemelman, supra note 73, at 195 & n.158. Class actions
declined from 1106 in 1975 to 51 in 1989. Id. at 196. The court also raised
obstacles to disparate impact claims. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,656-57 (1989) (holding that to make a prima facie showing
of disparate impact causation a plaintiff must identify a specific practice caus-
ing the disparate impact), modified by 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-2(m) (1994).
84. Although courts initially regarded such a characterization as unthink-
able, see Jiron v. Sperry Rand Corp., 423 F. Supp. 155, 166 (D. Utah 1975);
Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh Day Adventist, 401 F. Supp. 1363,
1379 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), it has become somewhat common. See, e.g., United
States v. Burke, 112 S.Ct. 1867, 1878 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (compar-
ing Title VII to tort law by analogy); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
1995]
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by repeatedly modifying and overruling Supreme Court deci-
sions85 and otherwise signaling that courts should interpret Ti-
tle VII broadly.8 6
228, 264 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same), modified by Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 200Oe-2 (1994)). Courts have also analyzed Title VII violations as similar to a
breach of implied contract. Dotson v. United States Postal Serv., 977 F.2d 976,
978 (6th Cir.) (per curiam) (evaluating harm in terms of right to the job), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 263 (1992); Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864
F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding after-acquired evidence of misconduct
precludes recovery); see also Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., 955 F.2d 409, 413
(6th Cir. 1992) (determining that resume fraud may constitute a just cause de-
fense to civil rights suit).
Last term, in a case involving "after acquired evidence," the Court took a
step towards restoring Title vIrs broad social purposes and empowerment of
private attorneys general. See McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 884 (1995) (indicating
that private litigants vindicate the objectiveness of Title VII). In holding that
such evidence cannot act as a bar to recovery, the Court emphasized the role of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") in "an ongoing congres-
sional effort to eradicate discrimination in the workplace." Id. The after-ac-
quired evidence defense arises when the employer, after the initiation of
litigation, discovers evidence of a material misrepresentation in the application
process (or misconduct of the employee), that would have justified the termina-
tion if known. McKennon arose under the ADEA, but the Court made it clear
that its reasoning and holding applied to Title VII and other laws bearing on
employment discrimination. See id. at 883-84 (stating that ADEA is only part
of a wide statutory scheme to protect employees).
85. Indeed Title VII has produced more legislative overrulings of Supreme
Court decisions than any other statute enacted. See, e.g., Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (expanding Title
VII to include discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions by overruling Supreme Court precedent holding that preg-
nancy discrimination was not sex discrimination); Voting Rights Act Amend-
ments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982) (clarifying dates and
definitions concerning voting rights by modifying Supreme Court precedent).
In a particularly dramatic example, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturned or
modified six Supreme Court decisions. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 3(3) 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (providing additional employment dis-
crimination remedies by modifying Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S.
642, 659-60 (1989), and overruling EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244
(1991); West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey 499 U.S. 83 (1991); Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 177 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T Technolo-
gies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258
(1989)).
86. The 1991 Amendment, for instance, expressly states that one of its pur-
pose was 'to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the
scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to
victims of discrimination." Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(4),
105 Stat 1071 (1991). See also Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (establishing EEOC); Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (expanding Title
VII protection to include pregnancy). Thus, Congress intended for courts to in-
terpret such statutes broadly.
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Section 1981, derived from Section One of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, guarantees all citizens the same right "to make and
enforce contracts" regardless of race.87 The rights guaranteed
by § 1981 encompass formation88 and judicial enforcement8 9 of
contracts. Section 1981 also redresses humiliation and embar-
rassment resulting from violations of its provisions. 90
Where Title VII and § 1981 overlap, § 1981 has procedural
advantages over Title VII.91 Prior to the Civil Rights Act of
1991, plaintiffs used § 1981 to obtain legal damages unavailable
under Title V]1.92 The 1991 Act overturned Supreme Court pre-
cedent holding that § 1981 did not reach performance of con-
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). The Court has held that Congress enacted
§ 1981 to overcome chronic discrimination in contracting and that it was consti-
tutional under Congress's remedial provision in § 2 of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168-70 (1976). Section 1981 is
broader than Title VII in that it reaches all contracts, not just those for employ-
ment. It is "co-extensive" with Title VII, in that it is not abridged by the exist-
ence of Title VII. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 461
(1975). It is narrower than Title VII, however, in that it only reaches discrimi-
nation on the basis of race. 2 CHARLEs A. SULLiVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMMATION § 21.2.1, at 468 (2d ed. 1988). Where the statutes' coverage
overlaps, courts often apply precedent under either one. See infra notes 94-98
and accompanying text (discussing interrelation of civil rights statutes).
The history of § 1981 reflects a cycle of expansion. Courts originally ap-
plied § 1981 only to the federal government, then expanded its reach to the
states, and finally to private parties. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 170. Consequently,
§ 1981 became a significant element of employment discrimination litigation
because it offered remedies not available under Title VII until 1991. 2 SuLLi-
VAN, supra, § 21.1, at 464-67. In 1989, the Supreme Court limited the scope of
§ 1981, holding that it did not reach discriminatory firing claims. Patterson,
491 U.S. at 171. In 1991, Congress responded by overruling that holding. 42
U.S.C. § 1981(b) (1994).
88. Thus the statute prohibits the refusal, on the basis of race, to enter into
a contract. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 176-77. Section 1981 reaches a broad range
of conduct. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Security Inn Food & Beverage, 819 F.2d 69, 70-71
(4th Cir. 1987) (finding that covered conduct includes discriminatory applica-
tion of hotel bar's policy of ejecting persons who do not order drinks); Grier v.
Specialized Skills Inc., 326 F. Supp. 856, 860 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (finding that cov-
ered conduct includes discrimination in admissions to barber school).
89. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 177.
90. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 182 (affirming holding that § 1981 makes injured
feelings and humiliation compensable).
91. Namely, § 1981 does not require administrative exhaustion. Prior to
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which extended the statute of limitations under
Title VII, § 1981 also had the advantage of incorporating those state statutes of
limitations which were longer than Title VIis.
92. 2 SULLrVAN, supra note 87, §§ 23.1-23.11, at 521-27.
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tracts and bolstered Title VII by making- legal damages
available thereunder. 93
The Court views laws bearing on employment discrimina-
tion as an interwoven system94 and frequently reads them in
pari materia.9 5 For instance, the elements of a prima facie case
under Title VII also apply to § 1981 suits. 9 6 Courts treat prece-
dent under the Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the 1964 Act, as
particularly relevant authority under Title VII. 9 7 Similarly, 42
U.S.C. § 1982, 98 which addresses discrimination in real estate
markets, has particular bearing on § 1981 because both derive
from the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. M 1991). Congress declared that "additional
remedies under federal law are needed to deter... intentional discrimination
in the workplace." Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2(1), 105
Stat. 1071 (1991). In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 165-82
(1989), the Supreme Court limited § 1981 to the formation of contracts and
their enforcement in court. The Court reasoned that the enactment of Title VII
implied areas of the employment relationship not covered by § 1981. Id. The
1991 Act made it clear that § 1981 covers "the making, performance, modifica-
tion, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,
terms and conditions of the contractual relationship." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)
(Supp. II 1991). As a practical matter, since the 1991 Act, the issue of where
§ 1981 and Title VII overlap has lost most of its significance.
94. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 884
(1995).
95. Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 847, 849-50 (7th Cir. 1982) (en banc);
EEOC v. Bailey, 563 F.2d 439, 453 (6th Cir. 1977); Waters v. Heublein, Inc.,
547 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1976) (The distinction between laws aimed at de-
segregation and laws aimed at equal opportunity is illusory.").
96. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 185-87. See supra note 79 (discussing burden of
proof in employment discrimination litigation).
97. Bailey, 563 F.2d at 453; Waters, 547 F.2d at 469-70. Both statutes are
civil rights measures that permit charges brought by a person who has suffered
"a distinct and palpable injury." Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,
372 (1982) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)). Both statutes
empower litigants to act as private attorneys general. Although the adminis-
trative phase is optional under Title VIII and mandatory under Title VII, the
enforcement provisions are "essentially the same." Yelnosky, supra note 11, at
424-25 (noting that courts have recognized the congressional intention to con-
strue Title VII standing broadly).
98. Section 1982 provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the
same right as enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988).
Although the language of § 1982 raises questions as to the coverage of whites,
the Supreme Court has interpreted § 1981 to forbid any distinctions on the ba-
sis of race. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976).
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C. STANDING IN THE CVIL RiGHTS CoNTEXT
Courts have granted standing liberally in civil rights
cases. 99 Title VII, in particular, confers standing to the fullest
extent permissible under the Constitution. 00 Lower courts,
however, have reached inconsistent decisions concerning
whether indirect injuries are constitutionally cognizable under
Title VI.l*1O It is also unclear under what circumstances courts
will grant injunctive relief. Although courts articulate the low
99. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280-81
n.14 (1978) (granting standing to white medical school applicant although he
could not show that the school would admit him absent challenged policy); Coit
v. Green, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1164 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (granting
standing to black parents of public school children challenging tax-exempt sta-
tus of racially exclusive private schools); see also City of Richmond v. JAL
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477, 483 (1989) (concerning challenge to minority set-
aside where plaintiffs could not show they would receive contracts absent pol-
icy); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,457 (1974) (concerning parents of black
schoolchildren challenging state's provision of textbooks to racially exclusive
schools); Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 558 (1973) (concerning
black citizens challenging provision of temporary exclusive use of park facilities
to racially exclusive groups); EEOC Notice, supra note 3, 9 2168 (arguing that
in such cases the plaintiffs "acted as testers" because "they had no intention of
personally accepting any tangible benefit").
Test cases played an important role in attacking state sanctioned segrega-
tion. For instance, the conduct of black protesters testing the legality of segre-
gation resulted in challenges to segregated transportation facilities. Evers v.
Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202, 202-03 (1958) (per curiam); see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 552-53 (1967). In these cases, the protesters' intention to use the facilities
in question solely to instigate a law suit did not preclude standing. Evers, 358
U.S. at 204; see Pierson, 386 U.S. at 558.
100. Courts reason that the language of Title VII permitting suit "by a per-
son claiming to be aggrieved" manifests congressional intent that standing ex-
tend to the fullest possible extent. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Corp.,
409 U.S. 205, 209 (1971) (finding congressional intent to extend standing under
Title VII to the extent Article III permits) (citing with approval Hackett v. Mc-
Guire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 1971)).
101. A comparison of two cases reveals the inconsistency. In Patee v. Pacific
Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 803 F.2d 476, 477 (9th Cir. 1986), male employ-
ees alleged that they suffered diminished wages because the employer discrimi-
nated against the predominantly female department in which they worked.
Although the alleged prohibited conduct, sex discrimination, resulted in con-
crete injuries, diminished wages, the Ninth Circuit denied standing to the male
employees because Title VII does not protect majority class members' interests.
Id. at 478-79.
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit found no barrier to standing when a white
cafeteria school district employee challenged an allegedly discriminatory enroll-
ment policy. Clayton v. White Hall Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 676, 680 (8th Cir. 1989).
The Court held that Title VII protects the freedom from a discriminatory work-
place, regardless of the plaintiff's class status. Id. at 679-80; see Waters, 547
F.2d at 469 (granting standing to white employee suing for discriminatory hir-
ing practices which excluded African Americans and Hispanics).
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standard of a "reasonable expectation" of future discrimina-
tion,102 in effect, the burden of proving the need for injunctive
relief appears heavy, and the inquiry focuses on the extent of
prior discrimination. 10 3
102. Most courts hold injunctive relief appropriate where an employer has
violated Title VII unless there is "no reasonable expectation that the employer
will discriminate in the future." Yelnosky, supra note 11, at 436; see, e.g.,
Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1233 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1005
(1991); EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1519 (9th Cir. 1989) (granting
injunctive relief unless employer proves the unlikeliness of repeating discrimi-
natory practices); EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539, 1544-45
(9th Cir. 1987) (same); Walls v. Mississippi State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 730
F.2d 306, 325 (5th Cir. 1984) (granting injunction when some cognizable danger
of recurrent violation exists); see also Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 946 n.13
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (granting injunctive relief when the offender did not take any
affirmative steps to prevent recurrences of sexual harassment). Some courts
have gone further by holding injunctive relief mandatory. Berkman v. City of
N.Y., 705 F.2d 584, 595 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding injunctive relief "appropriate"
whenever court finds a Title VII violation); NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 693
F.2d 1367, 1370-71 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding injunctive relief mandatory absent
clear and convincing proof that there is no reasonable probability of future
discrimination).
103. Courts frequently conclude that a reasonable expectation that an em-
ployer will discriminate in the future does not exist. See, e.g., Spencer v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 660 (4th Cir. 1990) (denying injunctive relief where
defendant had taken curative steps during litigation); Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d
at 1519 (granting injunction unless employer proves the unlikeliness of repeat-
ing discriminatory practices); Johnson v. Brock, 810 F.2d 219, 226 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (finding that judgment for plaintiff sufficiently encourages employer to
comply with Title VII); Walls, 730 F.2d at 325 (holding that a "cognizable dan-
ger" must exist to support an injunction).
Courts have not spoken with a single voice on whether a Title VII plaintiff
must be a member of the class benefiting from the injunction. Normally the
"personal benefit" doctrine requires that the plaintiff requesting injunctive re-
lief must personally benefit from any change in the defendant's conduct. For
Title VII litigants this has meant that injunctive relief is unavailable unless the
plaintiff is an employee of the defendant or likely to become one. Yelnosky,
supra note 11, at 436; e.g., Beattie v. United States, 949 F.2d 1092, 1093-94
(10th Cir. 1991) (holding that plaintiff who voluntarily quit could not prove
likely future injury); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir.
1982) (stating that plaintiff who left employment and did not seek reinstate-
ment was unlikely to get an injunction); Miller v. Texas State Bd. of Barber
Examiners, 615 F.2d 650, 654 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that injunctive relief is
unavailable where plaintiff experienced discrimination while an employee but
employer discharged him for legitimate reasons). In some circumstances, how-
ever, courts have ignored the personal benefits doctrine. E.g., Taylor v. USAIR,
Inc., 56 Fair Empl. Prac. (BNA) 357, 366 (W.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that a plain-
tiff, against whom defendant discriminated during application process but
eventually hired, may enjoin the discriminatory hiring practices despite no di-
rect effect on plaintiff).
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Section 1981, in contrast, subjects suits to prudential barri-
ers.1-0 4 Only interference with a person's contract rights on the
basis of race is actionable.10 5 Courts have granted third party
standing where plaintiffs have alleged that their injuries re-
sulted from the defendants' interference with the contractual re-
lations between plaintiffs and third parties. 0 6
D. STANDING N TESTER CASES
Although the Fourth Circuit in 1971 presumed that stand-
ing presented no obstacle to employment testers under Title
VII,'0 7 some courts have subsequently demonstrated antipathy
towards employment tester suits.108 Housing testers, on the
other hand, have received standing for some time.10 9 In Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman,11° the Supreme Court ruled that hous-
104. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 512-14 (1975). See supra notes 7, 87-90
and accompanying text (discussing the provisions of § 1981).
105. Warth, 422 U.S. at 512-14.
106. See, e.g., Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water Dist., 601 F.2d 9, 14 (1st Cir.
1979) (recognizing that § 1981 implies cause of action for interference with
"right to make contracts with nonwhites"); Winston v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 558
F.2d 1266, 1270 (6th Cir. 1977) (recognizing cause of action for white person
whom his employer injured in retaliation for refusing to violate minorities
rights); DeMatteir v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306, 311-12 (2d Cir. 1975)
(same); Fowler v. McCrory Corp., 727 F. Supp. 228, 232-33 (D. Md. 1989)
(granting third-party standing to white employee fired for opposing employer's
hiring discrimination); cf. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 237
(1969) (stating § 1982 confers a cause of action for interference with property
contracts on the basis of race); see also Landever, supra note 3, at 400 & n.160
(arguing that the cited cases endorse standing for injuries suffered as a result of
defending those whom § 1981 protects).
107. Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86, 87 (4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
The defendant did not contest the issue of standing. See id. One judge, fore-
shadowing future developments, complained that the "entire case smacked of
nothing but manufactured litigation." Id. at 90 (Boreman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
108. The Fourth Circuit suggested in dicta that it considered an applicant's
motive a relevant factor. Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 585 F.2d 625, 641 (4th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979). Likewise, a Georgia District Court
held that a plaintiff must be a bona fide applicant to show a prima facie case of
discrimination. Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 657 F. Supp.
1022, 1032-33 (M.D. Ga. 1987) (citing Sledge, 585 F.2d at 641; Lea, 438 F.2d at
90 (Boreman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). The reasoning of
these courts, however, conflicts with the disparate treatment theory's focus on
employer's intent. See supra notes 77, 79 and accompanying text (discussing
Title VIi's litigation structure).
109. See Richardson v. Howard, 712 F.2d 319, 321 (7th Cir.1983) ("[T]he evi-
dence provided by testers is frequently valuable, if not indispensable."); WII.
LLAM M. KUNSTLER, My LIFE AS A RADIcAL LAWYER 95 (1994) (describing testing
to discover housing discrimination as an "old and proven practice").
110. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
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ing testers had standing under Title VIII.111 Further, the Court
held that the "resources drain" of identifying and counteracting
a defendant's discriminatory practices constituted a cognizable
injury to the sponsoring organization. 112 Following Havens,
lower courts have found standing for housing testers under
§ 1981113 and § 1982.114 These courts have held that the in-
fringement of contract or property rights1 5  and the
consequential emotional harm satisfy standing's injury
requirement. 116
111. Id. at 372-74. The defendant allegedly subjected the testers to "racial
steering practices." Id. at 366 n.1. On the same day, a white and a black tester
inquired about apartments. The defendant showed the white tester an all-
white building but only informed the black tester about an opening in an inte-
grated building. Id. at 368. Both the white and black testers brought suit. Id.
at 373.
The Court held that Title VIII created a right to truthful information and a
violation of that right occurs regardless of the inquirer's intent. Id. at 373-74.
See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Corp., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1971) (stating
that Title VIII empowers a litigant to act as private attorneys general). The
Court, however, denied standing to the white tester who received truthful infor-
mation. Havens, 455 U.S. at 373-74.
In holding the tester's intent irrelevant, the Court relied on classic civil
rights cases where protesters with no interest in the integrated facilities none-
theless brought suit. Id. (citing Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958) (per
curiam); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 558 (1967)); see infra note 120 and ac-
companying text (discussing EEOC's similar reasoning on employment tester
standing).
112. Havens, 455 U.S. at 379-80. Housing Opportunities Made Equal's
identifying and counteracting defendant's discriminatory conduct allegedly
forced the sponsoring organization to divert significant resources from its coun-
seling and referral services. Id.
113. Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894,898
(3d Cir. 1977); Coel v. Rose Tree Manor Apartments, Inc., No. 84-1521, 1987
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9212, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1987); Sherman Park Commu-
nity Ass'n v. Wauwatosa Realty Co., 486 F. Supp. 838, 842 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
114. Watts v. Boyd Properties Inc., 758 F.2d 1482, 1484-85 (11th Cir. 1985);
Village of Bellwood v. Gorey & Ass'n, 664 F. Supp. 320, 325-26 (N.D. M1l. 1987).
Section 1982, also codified from Section One of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, is
pertinent authority for § 1981, mirroring the relationship between Title VII and
Title VIH. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (describing the rela-
tionship of civil rights statutes).
115. Watts, 758 F.2d at 1484-85; Meyers, 559 F.2d at 898; Coel, 1987 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9212, at *16; Village of Bellwood, 664 F. Supp. at 327; Sherman
Park Community Ass'n, 486 F. Supp. at 842.
116. Carter v. Duncan-Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225, 1238 (D.C. Cir 1984);
Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 698 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curium);
Davis v. Mansard, 597 F. Supp. 334, 336 (N.D. Ind. 1984). See also Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 166 (1976) (affirming award of damages for humiliation
and embarrassment under § 1981).
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E. STANDING ACCORDING TO THE EEOC
The EEOC has concluded in its compliance manual that em-
ployment testers have standing to sue under Title VII.117 The
EEOC reasoned that Title VII prohibits employers from re-
jecting employment applicants on impermissible bases. 118 Thus,
discrimination itself constitutes an injury.119 The EEOC noted
that historically "testers in one form or another" have advanced
civil rights. 20 Relying further on housing tester precedent, the
EEOC argued that employment testers "serve essentially the
same function" as housing testers.' 2 '
Despite less authoritative weight than administrative regu-
lations, 122 the EEOC's extensive expertise in employment dis-
crimination matters has entitled its guideline interpretations of
Title VII to great deference. 123 Courts generally have deferred
to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. 124 In deter-
117. EEOC Notice, supra note 3, 2168. The EEOC considered this step
after a national investigation revealed widespread discrimination in recruiting.
EEOC Chairman Says Agency Receiving Influx of Charges Against Job Agen-
cies, 113 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 113, at Al (June 12, 1991).
118. EEOC Notice, supra note 3, 2168.
119. Id. Accordingly, the testers' intentions are irrelevant. Id.
120. Id. The EEOC argues that testers advanced many important civil
rights cases. Id. The EEOC cited cases where plaintiffs challenged the tax-ex-
empt status of racially exclusive schools but had no intention of attending those
schools or sought to desegregate transportation facilities but had no intention of
using those facilities. Id. (citing Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 829 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (challenging state benefits to racially exclusive schools); Coit v. Green,
404 U.S. 997 (1971) (same); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1974) (same);
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (black clergymen went to segregated bus
terminal for sole purpose of testing legality of segregation); Evers v. Dwyer, 358
U.S. 202 (1958) (per curiam) (plaintiff rode Memphis bus for sole purpose of
testing legality of segregation)).
121. Title VII is "functionally identical" to Title VII. Id. (quoting Waters v.
Heublein, 547 F.2d at 469).
122. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-45 (1976).
123. Id. at 140-45; Griggs v. Duke Power Co, 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
See also Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231, 236 (1976) (stating that when con-
struing a statute, courts should give significant consideration to the construc-
tion of that statute by the agency responsible for its enforcement); New York
State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973) (stating that
absent compelling indications of inaccuracy, courts should follow construction
of statute by the agency responsible for its enforcement); Federal Maritime
Comm'n v. Seatrin Lines, 411 U.S. 726, 745 (1973) (stating that courts will ordi-
narily affirm the administrative interpretation of a statute if it has a reasonable
basis in law); Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 52 (1939) (stating
the general rule as following the administrative interpretation when not con-
flicting with the statute itself).
124. Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 336 (1930); McLaren v. Fleischer, 256
U.S. 477, 481 (1921).
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mining the weight of agency interpretation, courts have also
contemplated whether the agency carefully considered the mat-
ter and reached a result consistent with congressional intent
and case law.1 25
II. FAIR EMPLOYMENT COUNCIL OF GREATER
WASHINGTON, INC. v BMC MARKETING CORP.
After BMC referred only the white testers for employment
in 1990,126 the Council and the testers brought suit against
BMC under Title VII1 2 7 and § 1981.128 The district court held
that the Council and the testers had standing under both stat-
utes.12 9 In FEC, the D.C. Circuit denied the testers standing130
and only granted the organization standing under Title VII to
the extent it could show injury to its programs, apart from any
resources the Council expended on testing BMC.. 3 '
125. E.g., Estate of Sanford, 308 U.S. at 52; Brewster, 280 U.S. at 327.
126. FEC, 28 F.3d at 1270. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Council's test of BMC).
127. FEC, 28 F.3d at 1270. See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text
(discussing the history and scope of Title VII and § 1981). In particular, the
Title VII claim rested on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b), which provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency
to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on
the basis of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1994).
128. FEC, 28 F.3d at 1270. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text
(discussing § 1981).
129. Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Mktg.
Corp., 829 F. Supp. 402, 404-07 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 28
F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The District Court's analysis rested on the Supreme
Court's grant of standing to testers in other contexts. Id. at 404 (citing Evers v.
Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958) (per curiam) (holding that plaintiffs boarded segre-
gated bus "for the purpose of instituting this litigation is not significant");
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (holding testers have
standing under the Fair Housing Act)). The court found that the plaintiffs' inju-
ries were cognizable because the testers actually possessed an interest in refer-
rals, a protected right under § 2000e-2(b). Id. at 405. In rejecting the argument
that the testers had not alleged likelihood of future injury, the court reasoned
that because the testers control whether they have any future contact with
BMC they "have no problem establishing a probability of future injury." Id.
The court further held that the Council's allegations of BMC's forcing it to
"devote scarce resources to identifying and counteracting" discriminatory con-
duct sufficiently supported standing. Id. at 407.
130. FEC, 28 F.3d at 1270-74.
131. Id. at 1276-81.
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A. THE TESTERS' STANDING
The Court of Appeals found that the testers did not suffer
an injury cognizable under § 1981.132 The court dealt separately
with the allegations that BMC denied the testers opportunities
to contract with BMC itself and with others on referral.'3 3 The
court found that the testers had made material misrepresenta-
tions to BMC134 and that the agency had the right to void at will
any resulting contracts. 135 Loss of the opportunity to enter into
a voidable contract, the court held, could not constitute an injury
in fact.136 Likewise, the court found that because the testers
had no intention of accepting any positions on referral, at most,
they lost the "opportunity to refuse" to enter into contracts with
BMC's clients. 137
The court declined to follow precedent from other cir-
cuits, 1 38 which upheld housing testers' standing under § 1981
and § 1982.139 The court found that these cases had merely as-
sumed the existence of a cause of action.140 Likewise, the court
found inapposite the Supreme Court's holding in Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman that housing testers have standing under Title
VI1.14' The court reasoned that, whereas Title VIII creates an
132. Id. at 1271.
133. Id. at 1270-71.
134. The testers misrepresented their intentions respecting employment
and presented "fictitious credentials" to BMC. Id. at 1271.
135. FEC, 28 F.3d at 1271.
136. Id. The court reasoned that "a void contract is a nullity." Id. at 1270-
71 (citing Kawitt v. United States, 843 F.2d 951, 953 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding
that a job obtained by material misrepresentation is not a property right for
Fifth Amendment Due Process purposes)).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1271-72. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing cases granting standing under § 1981 and § 1982).
139. FEC, 28 F.3d at 1271.
140. Id. (distinguishing Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership
Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1977), overruled on other grounds by Goodman v.
Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 482 U.S. 656 (1987); Watts
v. Boyd Properties, 758 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1985)); see supra notes 113-16 and
accompanying text (discussing housing tester standing under § 1981 and
§ 1982). The court found Meyers only afrmed the principle "that a plaintiff's
standing is not defeated by the fact that he subjected himself to legal injury
solely for the purpose of determining whether his rights would be violated, with
the intent to bring suit if they were." Id. The court found Watts unpersuasive
because the decision relied primarily on Meyers. Id.
141. Id. at 1271-72 (distinguishing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455
U.S. 363 (1982)). See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text (discussing
Havens).
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"enforceable right to truthful information,"142 § 1981 contains no
comparable guarantee. 143
Turning to Title VII, the court found the testers could not
recover damages 1 " and did not have standing to seek prospec-
tive relief.' 45 While acknowledging that Title VII is more analo-
gous to Title VIII than § 1981, the court found critical
differences in the available remedies. 146 Because the conduct at
issue occurred prior to 1991, only prospective relief remained
available to the testers. 47
Without addressing whether the testers could sustain inju-
ries cognizable under Title VlI,14 the court held that the testers
lacked standing under City of Los Angeles v. Lyons because they
had not alleged sufficient likelihood of future injury.149 The
court rejected the district court's reasoning that the testers' abil-
ity to re-initiate contact with BMC obviated the requirement to
plead the likelihood of future injury.'5 0 The court relied on Lu-
jan v. Defenders of Wildlife, where the plaintiff's ability to
purchase airline tickets to the countries allegedly affected by the
challenged foreign aid policy did not cure their failure to plead a
142. FEC, 28 F.3d at 1272.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1272.
145. Id. at 1272-74.
146. Id. at 1272.
147. Id. (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (1993) (hold-
ing that new remedial provisions in the 1991 Amendments did not apply
retroactively)).
148. Id. at 1272 n.1.
149. Id. at 1273 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.8
(1983)); see supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
reasoning and holding in Lyons).
150. FEC, 28 F.3d at 1272-73. The District Court distinguished Lyons on
the ground that the testers, themselves, controlled whether contact with BMC
would be re-initiated, whereas Lyons had no control over whether the police
would stop him again. Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v.
BMC Mktg. Corp., 829 F. Supp. 402, 405 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd in part and aff'd
inpart, 28 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994). See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying
text (discussing Lyons). The circuit court objected to this reading of Lyons.
FEC, 28 F.3d at 1274 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 112 S. Ct. 2130,
2139 n.2 (1992) (rejecting argument that plaintiff need only plead future injury
where harm depends on actions of third parties)). The court reasoned that even
if the testers returned to BMC as bona fide candidates, they would assume the
same position as Lyons, who could have initiated an incident with the police but
could not control whether the police would employ the challenged chokehold.
Id. The court also rejected arguments based on "BMC's continuing failure" to
refer the testers. Id. at 1273-74. The court further rejected the testers' argu-
ment that ongoing humiliation and embarrassment caused an injury, reasoning
that such harms were "effects" rather than threatened injuries. Id. at 1274 (cit-
ing Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107).
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present intention to visit those countries. 151 The court added
that BMC had no duty to consider the testers for referral be-
cause they now knew of the testers' deception.1 52
B. THE COUNCIL'S STANDING
Turning to the Council's § 1981 claim, the court found that
it did not have a personal claim 153 and could not base standing
on injury to third persons.154 Defining prudential standing
analysis as a set of canons of statutory interpretation, the court
found that the Council's suit ran afoul of the presumption
against claims based on the violation of other's rights.1 55
The court declined to adopt an approach balancing the
third-party standing factors156 by holding that "obstacles" and
alignment-of-interest are independent prerequisites for third-
party standing.157 The court reconciled Supreme Court prece-
dent by recognizing exceptions for "special relationships," such
as doctor-client or vendor-vendee relationships. 158 The court
found the "obstacles" confronting direct victims of BMC's alleged
discrimination insufficient to support the inference that § 1981
conferred a cause of action upon the Council.159 Noting that di-
rect victims may not know that prospective employers had dis-
151. Id. at 1274 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2139
n.2 (1992) (rejecting argument plaintiff need only plead future injury where
harm depends on actions of third parties)). See supra notes 47-53 (discussing
the holding in Lujan).
152. FEC, 28 F.3d at 1274. Moreover, given the testers "adversarial rela-
tionship with BMC," the court found the possibility they would return as bona
fide candidates or even as testers implausible. Id.
153. Id. at 1277. BMC's alleged conduct did not interfere with the Council's
ability to contract, and the Council could not seek an employment referral. Id.
154. Id. at 1278-81.
155. Id. at 1277-81. The court distinguished cases finding standing for indi-
rect injuries under § 1981 as resting on the principle that § 1981 protects those
who refuse to violate other's § 1981 rights against "private retaliation." Id. at
1278-79.
156. Id. at 1280. The Third Circuit, recognizing "inconsistent streams" in
the Supreme Court's third party standing analysis, adopted a balancing ap-
proach in Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742, 749-50 & n.8 (3d Cir. 1991). The
approach weighs the plaintiffs showing of both obstacle and relationship fac-
tors. Id. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (explaining Amato).
157. FEC, 28 F.3d at 1280-81.
158. Id. The court distinguished four types of third-party standing cases:
obstacle cases, cases where "the third party's rights protect that party's rela-
tionship with the litigant,"such as in a vendor-vendee relationship, cases in-
volving "special relationships," such as the one between attorney and client,
and First Amendment overbreadth challenges. Id. at 1280.
159. Id.
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criminated against them, the court reasoned that the Council
could solve the problem by publishing the results of its test.160
The court granted the Council standing under Title VII only
to the extent that BMC's refusal to refer bona fide candidates
"perceptibly impaired" the Council's activities. 161 The court re-
jected the argument that the diversion of resources from other
programs to the testing project in itself caused an injury in
fact 162 because it found such reasoning circular and a circum-
vention of the injury requirement. 163 To maintain its action, the
Council would have had to demonstrate specific programmatic
injuries such as diminished effectiveness of outreach or job coun-
seling programs resulting from BMC's discriminatory
conduct.' 64
I. A CRITICAL RESPONSE TO FEC AND AN
ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS OF
TESTER STANDING
The FEC court should have granted standing to the testers
under both Title VII and § 1981. The court should have recog-
nized that BMC's discriminatory conduct caused programmatic
injury, manifesting itself in the Council's testing program. The
court misapplied general standing principles and precedent and
ignored the true nature of the claims the testers and the Council
asserted. Moreover, the court's reasoning represents an unfor-
160. Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin 422 U.S. 490, 510 (1975) (denying third-
party standing because direct victims are "not disabled from asserting" their
own claims); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 414-15 (1991) (granting third-party
standing because of "daunting" barriers to suit by excluded juror)).
161. Id. at 1277.
162. FEC, 28 F.3d at 1276-77.
163. Id. The court reasoned that the testers inflicted the injury themselves
because the testing program came out of the Council's "own budgetary choices."
Id. at 1276. Although the court acknowledged Supreme Court precedent hold-
ing the resources drain of counteracting discrimination cognizable under Title
VIII, it reasoned that such precedent did not confer standing on the basis of
resources diverted from one program to another because the resources drain
was not a "manifestation of the injury" that the allegedly illegal conduct had
caused. Id. at 1277 (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379
n.20 (1982)). The court declined to follow the Seventh Circuit, which held that
"deflection of the agency's time and money" to legal efforts sustains sufficient
injury. Id. (citing Village of Bellwood v. Dwiveldi, 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir.
1990)). Extension of such logic, the court noted, would lead to the absurdity
that an organization dedicated to securing enforcement of civil rights laws
could base standing on the ground that litigating against one discriminating
employer had drained resources from potential suits against other employers.
Id.
164. Id.
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tunate trend whereby analyses construing civil rights legislation
narrowly diminish civil rights claims by severing their public as-
pects. The resulting tort-like jurisprudence does not serve con-
gressional intent.
A. THE FEC COURT MISCONSTRUED STADING DocTRm AND
MISCHARACTERIZED TEsTERs' CLAIMs
The FEC court construed both § 1981 and Title VII incon-
sistently with their remedial purposes by treating injury more
narrowly than either statute warrants. Indeed, the court con-
sistently mischaracterized the injuries alleged by the testers
and the Council, casting them as private harms devoid of the
public significance Congress vested in civil rights statutes. The
court erred in relying on City of Los Angeles v. Lyons 165 and Lu-
jan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 166 because these cases rested on pol-
icies inapplicable to either tester or organizational standing.
Moreover, the court failed to defer to the EEOC guidelines.
1. Section 1981 Protects Broader Rights than the FEC Court
Recognized
a. Discriminatory Treatment of Testers' Applications
Constitutes Injury Under Section 1981
Section 1981's broad language and remedial purposes en-
compass the injuries sustained by the testers. Congress enacted
§ 1981 to eliminate pervasive discrimination in contracting. 167
By its terms, § 1981 guarantees "the same... right to make and
enforce contracts" to all citizens regardless of race.168 An appli-
cant whose credentials receive discriminatory consideration
does not enjoy the same right to make contracts, in any mean-
ingful sense, as other citizens. 169
The testers' injuries derive from the infringement of their
right to non-discriminatory consideration of their applica-
tions.' 70 When an employer or employment agency segregates
165. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
166. 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992).
167. See supra notes 87-90 (describing § 1981).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994).
169. Discriminatory treatment denies the applicant not only the particular
employment opportunity but also valuable information about their worth on the
market and employment opportunities generally. See supra note 88 (discussing
§ 1981's coverage of contract formation). The refusal to consider or refer the
testers' applications clearly falls within the province of § 1981.
170. Cf Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 184 (1989) ("[T]he
question under § 1981 remains whether the employer, at the time of the forma-
1995]
154 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:123
applicants on the basis of race, it violates the applicants' rights
under § 1981,171 regardless of their intentions toward taking the
job.
Purposeful discrimination in itself violates § 1981.172
Courts must look to the employer's intent in assessing claims
under § 1981,173 for which the Supreme Court has developed a
burden-shifting analysis to assist in determining the employer's
intent.17 4 The Court, however, has never subjected plaintiffs to
such scrutiny.175 Thus, § 1981 entitles testers to an adjudica-
tion of their claims of differential treatment on the basis of race.
Testers' intentions toward a job should not determine their
rights under § 1981 because only the factors that actually moti-
tion of the contract, in fact intentionally refused to enter into a contract with the
employee on racially neutral terms."); id. at 210-11, 221 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing § 1981's broad application counsels against narrow construction
in the employment context and denial of opportunity to advance constitutes vio-
lation thereof); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 173 (1976) (finding that the
Court of Appeal's conclusion that denial of admission to school based on race
violates § 1981 "follows inexorably" from text of statute). Although Congress
overturned Patterson's essential holding that § 1981 does not reach post-forma-
tion conduct, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (1994), the Patterson court's focus on whether
the employer intentionally offered differing terms on the basis of race remains
valid. Moreover, Congress's overruling of Patterson implicitly ratifies the dis-
sent's position that denial of opportunity constitutes a violation of civil rights.
See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280 n.14 (1978)
(holding that an affirmative action program preventing plaintiff from competing
for all available places in medical school injured plaintiff within cognition of
Title VII).
171. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 669 (1987); McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-80 (1976); cf. Delaware State
College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 252-58 (1980) (discussing discriminatory treat-
ment of a college professor); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172-73 (1976)
(discussing similar discriminatory treatment of school applicants).
172. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
252-56 (1981) (emphasizing that intentional discrimination constitutes a viola-
tion of Title VII); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)
(same); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 796-805 (1973)
(same).
173. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing Title VIrs
litigation structure).
174. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (same).
175. Although the Court's analytical framework incorporates applicant or
employee characteristics, it does so only in the context of raising an inference
about the employers intent. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04. In-
deed, the Court has recently affirmed the principle that unless the defendant
knows of a plaintiff's misconduct when the allegedly discriminatory conduct oc-
curred, such misconduct has no bearing on whether the defendant violated the
plaintiff's rights. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879,
885-87 (1995).
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vated an employer's decision are relevant.17 6 Testers' intentions
have no bearing on the question of whether an employer invidi-
ously discriminated against them. Likewise, although testers
admittedly make material misrepresentations in their applica-
tions, an employer does not know of such misrepresentations
when it makes the challenged decision. Thus, the misrepresen-
tations cannot motivate an employer's decision.
Moreover, the precedent set by the FEC decision provides
no rational limitation. FEC places informational interviewing,
applications to price oneself on the market, and other job-search
steps taken without an intention to accept a particular job be-
yond the reach of § 1981. Yet, employers discriminating in these
areas deny applicants the same right to make employment con-
tracts as other citizens. 177
b. Testers Suffer Emotional Injuries
Testers also suffer embarrassment and humiliation result-
ing from invidious discrimination. 78 Courts recognize these as
injuries cognizable under § 1981 when alleged by bona fide ap-
plicants. 79 Because testers experience the same stigma and be-
littlement as bona fide applicants, discriminatory employment
practices denigrate testers and bona fide applicants alike.'80
Opponents of tester standing may assert that testers do not
suffer emotional injuries because they expect to experience dis-
crimination. As the EEOC noted, however, courts have consist-
ently recognized the injuries of "test" plaintiffs' 8 ' in the civil
rights context.' 8 2 Moreover, where, as here, testers have alleged
emotional injuries, 8 3 doubts as to the veracity of their claims
176. See, e.g., Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 (stating that defendant must clearly
set forth the reasons for rejecting plaintiff).
177. See Landever, supra note 3, at 394-95 (discussing race discrimination
in contracting).
178. See supra note 3 (discussing testers generally).
179. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 182 (1976).
180. As the courts once recognized, racial discrimination is, by definition,
class discrimination. See supra note 83 (discussing liberal judicial policies for
class certification in the past). Therefore, testers experience disparagement and
degradation along with other minorities who employers exclude by the discrimi-
natory conduct.
181. The EEOC defines "test" plaintiffs as plaintiffs who subject themselves
to discriminatory conduct for the purpose of testing its legality. EEOC Notice,
supra note 3, 2168.
182. Id.
183. FEC, 28 F.3d at 1273-74.
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merely raise questions of fact, which courts should decide at
trial.
c. Courts Recognize Fair Housing Testers' Similar Injuries
Other courts, recognizing the nature of testers' injuries,
have correctly held that § 1981 and § 1982 confer a cause of ac-
tion on fair housing testers.184 As the EEOC noted, fair housing
and fair employment testers serve essentially the same func-
tion.185 The FEC court should have followed precedent and
EEOC guidelines by holding that § 1981 recognizes employment
testers' injuries as cognizable.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized tester
standing under Title VIII.186 While Title VIII explicitly creates
a right to truthful information, the remedial nature of civil
rights legislation as a whole counsels against restrictive con-
struction of precedent thereunder.1 8 7 Fair employment and fair
housing are but "opposite sides of the same coin,"188 and truthful
information is as relevant to the job search as to the housing
market. The FEC court should have followed Title VIII prece-
dent in its § 1981 analysis and found that employment testers
have standing.
d. The FEC Court Severed the Public Aspect of Section 1981
by Reducing Testers' Allegations to an Untenable
Property Claim
The circuit court's holding erroneously reduces § 1981's pro-
tection to narrow economic interests.18 9 By focusing on the test-
ers' interest in contracts with BMC or on referral, the court
completely evades the substance of their claims. 190 Section
1981, however, protects more than a narrow property interest in
a particular job. Indeed, in 1991 Congress rebuffed judicial ef-
forts to so limit § 1981's coverage.1 9 '
184. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text (discussing cases in
which courts found standing for housing testers under § 1981 and § 1982).
185. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text (discussing EEOC Pol-
icy Guidance).
186. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372-74 (1982).
187. See supra note 99 (discussing liberal standing in civil rights cases).
188. Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466,469 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 915 (1977).
189. See FEC, 28 F.3d at 1270-71.
190. See id. The court's comparison of testers' injuries to Fifth Amendment
takings jurisprudence is telling in this regard.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (1994) (overruling Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)). Even the Patterson court, moreover, acknowl-
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In addition to narrowing the scope of injuries that Congress
designed § 1981 to redress, the FEC court's analysis divests
§ 1981 of its public aspects. Section 1981 contemplates societal
and structural change. 192 The court, however, treated the test-
ers as if they had merely alleged an interference with contrac-
tual relations or another strictly private harm.193 Thus
construed, the testers' claim to § 1981's protection became
incomprehensible.
Testers' intentions and misrepresentations do not deter-
mine their rights under § 1981.194 Only by mischaracterizing
the testers' claims does the court purport to render such facts
relevant to the standing inquiry. The same mischaracterization
renders irrelevant the congressional interest of having discrimi-
natory practices removed through litigation.
2. The FEC Court Misinterpreted Third-Party Standing
Exceptions as Categorical Rather than Policy-Based
The court of appeals treats organizational standing under
§ 1981 as narrowly as it treats cognizable injuries. 195 As the
court acknowledged in its Title VII analysis, the Council alleged
concrete injury in the form of set-backs to its programs further-
ing equal employment.196 Although such injuries result from
BMC's conduct toward third parties, § 1981 renders the rule in-
apposite in the case of an organization sponsoring testers.
In this case, powerful countervailing considerations support
third-party standing. As the court itself noted, prudential rules
are rules of construction.197 Courts should balance third-party
factors to accommodate the showing on both obstacle and rela-
tionship factors and to address the standing policies served.' 98
Where "countervailing considerations" outweigh a prudential
edged that discriminatory conduct occurring at the initial stages of the con-
tracting relationship violates § 1981. 491 U.S. at 180-81.
192. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (discussing § 1981
generally).
193. FEC, 28 F.3d at 1270-71.
194. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (discussing § 1981
generally).
195. See supra notes 153-64 (discussing D.C. Circuit's analysis of organiza-
tional standing under § 1981).
196. See supra notes 167-71 (discussing testers' injuries).
197. FEC, 28 F.3d at 1278.
198. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3
(1989); Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742, 749 (3d Cir. 1991); see supra notes 60-
69 and accompanying text (discussing third party standing generally).
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rule's underlying policies, the rule must give way.199 Although
the Council's association with bona fide candidates may not be
as "strong" as a doctor-client or vendor-vendee relationship, 200
the Council's interests converge with bona fide job seekers be-
cause both seek equal opportunity in the employment market.
Bona fide job applicants also face significant barriers to suit.20 1
Indeed, direct victims of BMC's alleged conduct will likely not
recognize any discriminatory acts against them because the na-
ture of the employment process hides the reasons, discrimina-
tory or otherwise, behind its results.20 2 Because the Council has
suffered concrete harm20 3 and has aligned its interests with
rightholders204 who face substantial barriers to suit,205 the D.C.
Circuit should have granted third-party standing to vindicate
the important policies behind § 1981.
Moreover, denying the Council standing furthers none of
the policies behind the prudential rules. While the Council
could conceivably recruit some bona fide applicant plaintiffs by
publishing the results of its test,20 6 the benefits of having those
plaintiffs as parties remains unclear. Recruiting actual appli-
cants would not produce a "better plaintiff" or a more adver-
sarial hearing because the interests of the Council and those
hypothetical plaintiffs are nearly identical.20 7 Nor is the Coun-
cil's complaint the kind of generalized grievance best addressed
by another governmental forum.208 To the contrary, both Con-
gress and the Executive Branch have spoken, and the Council
seeks to vindicate their common policy.209 Countervailing con-
199. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975).
200. See supra notes 69 (discussing inconsistencies in Supreme Court third
party standing jurisprudence), 158 (FEC court's reconciliation of same).
201. See supra notes 14-15 (discussing barriers to suit in failure to hire
cases generally).
202. See supra note 14 (discussing barriers to suit in failure to hire cases
generally).
203. FEC, 28 F.3d at 1276-78.
204. See supra notes 65-66, 68 (discussing relationship factors).
205. See supra note 64 (discussing the obstacle factor).
206. The FEC court itself suggested that the Council could recruit bona fide
plaintiffs by publishing the results of its tests. FEC, 28 F.3d at 1280.
207. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (describing policies be-
hind prudential rule against third party standing and exceptions); cf. Glad-
stone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (discussing what
constitutes a proper party for purposes of standing); Singleton v. Wulff, 428
U.S. 106, 114-15 (1976) (plurality opinion) (same); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
99-100 (1968) (same).
208. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
209. Congress has spoken through enactment and amendment of § 1981.
See supra notes 87-90 (discussing congressional intentions in enacting § 1981),
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siderations clearly outweigh the policies against third-party
standing in the case of employment testers.
The court should have noted § 1981's significance as part of
the foundation of our nation's civil rights legislation 210 and the
importance Congress has placed on the policy of eliminating em-
ployment discrimination. 211 The court should have evaluated
the Council's third-party standing in light of congressional in-
tent.212 The FEC court, however, evades policy-based argu-
ments by characterizing third-party standing jurisprudence as
categorical in nature.
3. The FEC Court Subjected Testers' Title VII Claims to
Unnecessary Formalism
Although the FEC court effectively avoids the question, Ti-
tle VII by its express terms reaches BMC's alleged conduct. 213
Precedent under Title VIH supports tester standing under Title
VII,21 4 and tester standing serves Title VII's broad deterrent
purposes.215 The D.C. Circuit, however, employed a constricted
view of standing requirements for litigants seeking injunctive
relief.
a. The FEC Court Improperly Relied on City of Los Angeles
v. Lyons and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
In denying tester standing under Title VII, the FEC court
relied on precedent serving separation of powers and federalism
values. Although the Supreme Court has indicated that these
93 (discussing congressional intentions in amending § 1981). The Executive
Branch, through the EEOC, has spoken in published guidelines. See supra
notes 117-21 (discussing the relevant EEOC notice).
210. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (discussing the origins of
U.S. civil rights legislation).
211. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (discussing some con-
gressional intentions in passing civil rights legislation).
212. Cf. supra note 81 and accompanying text (describing role of private at-
torneys general under Title VII). Although Congress has not granted standing
under § 1981 to the full extent of Article III, this determination does not end the
inquiry. If, as the court itself suggests, prudential rules are rules of statutory
interpretation, congressional intent must inform the court's evaluation of the
third-party standing factors.
213. Title VII prohibits refusal, by an employment agency, to refer for em-
ployment on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1994); see also EEOC
Notice, supra note 3, 1 2168 (finding standing for testers under Title VII).
214. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1982).
215. See supra notes 73-81 (discussing Title VIrs remedial purposes).
1995]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
values animate standing doctrine,216 they are irrelevant in the
context of employment tester standing under federal statutes.
The FEC court erred in its reliance on the denial of standing
in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.217 The balance of equities in
FEC differs from those in Lyons218 because Lyons repeatedly
emphasized that the plaintiff still had his damages remedy.21 9
In FEC, however, the denial of prospective relief left the testers
with no recourse. Moreover, because bona fide applicants proba-
bly will not discover the discrimination, denial of standing to
testers leaves BMC, and others who refer or employ entry level
job-seekers, with less incentive to comply with the law.220
In addition, Lyons served important federalism principles
not found in employment tester cases. The Lyons plaintiff asked
federal courts to supervise the policies of a metropolitan police
force. 221 The Court emphasized that "local authorities" would
better address these concerns.222 Here, the testers did not ask
the court to supervise any state agency. Furthermore, no more
appropriate authority exists to address BMC's conduct than the
federal courts. Thus, the court improperly applied Lyons's strin-
gent standard for pleading likelihood of injury to the employ-
ment tester case.
The court similarly misapplied Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life.223 Lujan's denial of standing to challenge foreign aid policy
for want of imminent injury224 reflected a concern for the proper
relationship between the judiciary and the executive. The
Supreme Court understandably declined to dictate American
foreign policy. FEC, however, involved no similar concerns.
216. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)
217. See FEC, 28 F.3d 1268, 1272-74 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing City of Los An-
geles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983)); supra notes 54-59 (discussing Lyons gener-
ally), 150 (describing FEC court's interpretation of Lyons).
218. See supra note 55 (discussing the Supreme Court's appraisal of the eq-
uities in Lyons).
219. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 103 (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502
(1974)).
220. Indeed the very obstacles which support the Council's third party
standing under § 1981 make it likely that BMC, and other employment agen-
cies, will face no deterrence to discriminatory conduct. See supra note 14 and
accompanying text (discussing barriers to suit in failure to hire cases
generally).
221. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111-12.
222. Id. at 111.
223. See FEC, 28 F.3d 1268, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2138 (1992)); supra notes 48-50 (discussing Lujan).
224. Lujan, 112 S.Ct. at 2138.
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FEC's denial of tester standing under Title VII thus rests on
inapplicable precedent. As the dissents in both Lujan and Lyons
noted, those decisions almost revived the kind of formal pleading
abolished by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 225 Ordina-
rily, however, courts must read pleadings to encompass the spe-
cific within the general.226 Where, as here, the plaintiff has the
power to initiate contact with the employer and has alleged a
pattern or practice of discrimination, 227 the court's action be-
comes an arch-formalism when it denies standing for failure to
allege an intention to approach the employer. Absent important
separation of powers or federalism concerns, such as those pres-
ent in Lujan and Lyons, the court has no basis for extending
such formalism to the standing inquiry.
b. Title VII Confers Broad Standing
The D.C. Circuit also should have granted standing be-
cause, under Title VII, plaintiffs receive broad standing. Con-
gress expressly granted Title VII plaintiffs the broadest possible
standing.228 Because the EEOC has asserted that testers have
standing,229 granting testers standing constitutes neither im-
propriety nor judicial trespass. Moreover, precedent in the civil
rights arena exists for liberal standing to pursue injunctive re-
lief.23 0 Under Title VII the inquiry tends to focus on the extent
of discriminatory conduct.231 Where, as here, the evidence indi-
cates a "pattern or practice" of discrimination, it justifies the is-
suance of injunctive relief.23 2
4. The Testing Program Manifests the Council's Injury
Although an organization itself decides where to "invest its
limited resources,"233 the FEC court erroneously concluded that
225. Id. at 2151-54 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Lyons, 461 U.S. at 120-21
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
226. Lujan, 112 S.Ct. at 2151-54.
227. FEC, 28 F.3d at 1273-74.
228. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Corp., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
229. EEOC Notice, supra note 3, 2168.
230. See supra notes 99 (discussing liberal standing in civil rights gener-
ally), 102-03 (discussing injunctive relief under Title VII), 120-23 and accompa-
nying text (discussing EEOC Interpretation of Title VII).
231. See supra note 103 (discussing the court's expectation that an employer
will discriminate in the future).
232. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982).
233. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text (discussing the FEC
court's limitations on organizational standing).
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testing represented a self-inflicted injury.23 4 Rather, expendi-
tures on such programs manifest the injury to the organization.
In the housing context, the Supreme Court has granted standing
based on the "drain on resources" of "identifying and counteract-
ing" discrimination. 23 5 Furthermore, all organizations necessar-
ily make budgetary determinations. Discriminating employers,
however, necessitate the expenditure of resources on testing.
Expenditures to counteract discrimination 23 6 are thus a "mani-
festation of the injury that those [asserted illegal] practices had
inflicted"23 7 upon the organization's interests.
5. The FEC Court Failed to Defer to EEOC Guidelines
By relegating the EEOC guidelines and amicus brief to a
mere footnote in the opinion,2 38 the FEC court ignored the well
established principle that courts give substantial deference to
the governmental agency responsible for administering a stat-
ute.23 9 The FEC court should have followed the EEOC's position
that testers have standing under Title V11 240 because the agency
made a well-reasoned interpretation of an ambiguous statute,
consistent with case law and congressional intent.241
B. FEC REPRESENTS AN UNFORTUNATE TREND OF JUDIcIAL
HosTnry TO PUBLIC LITIGATION
The D.C. Circuit Court's narrow analysis follows an unfor-
tunate trend in civil rights jurisprudence. 242 As courts view in-
vidious discrimination more as isolated private torts than as a
public structural impediment to equal access to the employment
marketplace,243 the scope of injuries deemed cognizable under
234. FEC, 28 F.3d at 1276. Almost any organizational injury imaginable is
"self-inflicted" as the FEC court defines the term. Rather, courts must ask
whether the challenged action necessitates the budgetary choice.
235. Havens, 455 U.S. at 379.
236. See FEC, 28 F.3d at 1276 (finding that expenditures made to counter-
act discriminatory conduct are cognizable).
237. Id. at 1277.
238. Id. at 1272 n.1.
239. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text (discussing agency
deference).
240. EEOC Notice, supra note 3, 2168. See supra notes 117-21 (describing
EEOC guidelines and reasoning).
241. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which
courts considered sufficiency of agency interpretation).
242. See Zemelnan, supra note 73, at 189-96 (discussingjudicial narrowing
of Title VII); supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (same).
243. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (discussing judicial nar-
rowing of Title VII).
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civil rights legislation narrows in proportion.2 '4 Although the
modern standing doctrine arose as a manifestation of the rise of
public litigation,245 it has become a tool for avoiding the merits
of public claims.
The circuit court's analysis reified judicial hostility toward
public litigation by masking its antipathy in seemingly neutral,
prophylactic rules. The court reduced the testers' § 1981 claim
to an untenable property claim, never acknowledging the nature
of the rights at stake.246 Further, the court divided third-party
standing cases into narrow categories,247 existing, along with
Lyons and Lujan,2 48 without reference to the policies they serve.
Just as the discrimination that testers seek to uncover, the
standing doctrine becomes an unspoken, invisible barrier that
never signifies its purposes.
Commentators have described judicial treatment of civil
rights litigation as subversive of congressional intent.249 Courts
manipulate standing, a doctrine ostensibly insuring that courts
respect their proper bounds, to impose judicial views on the pro-
priety of certain kinds of suits. 2 50 Restrictions on class certifica-
tion in the late 1970s and the 1980s accompanied the notion that
federal laws had largely remedied discrimination and that Title
VII had become overenforced.251 Today, restrictions on the indi-
vidual litigant follow. 2 52
244. See Chayes, supra note 34, at 10-26 (discussing judicial narrowing of
Title VII); Zemelman, supra note 73, at 189-95 (same); supra notes 82-84 and
accompanying text (same).
245. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution
of modern standing doctrine).
246. See supra notes 189-94 and accompanying text (discussing the method
and consequences of reducing testers' allegations to an untenable property
claim).
247. See supra notes 195-212 and accompanying text (discussing the FEC
coures division of third party standing cases into narrow categories).
248. See supra notes 215-26 and accompanying text (discussing the inappli-
cability of Lyons and Lujan as precedent).
249. Chayes, supra note 34, at 8; see also Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v.
Atentio, 490 U.S. 642, 662 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("One wonders
whether the majority still believes that race discrimination-or, more accu-
rately, race discrimination against nonwhites-is a problem in our society, or
even remembers that it ever was."); Zemelman, supra note 73, at 189-95 (dis-
cussing the enactment and judicial interpretations of Title VII).
250. See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 34, at 9-10 (discussing judicial manipula-
tion of standing); Nichol, supra note 34, at 75-79 (same); see also notes 42-53
and accompanying text (describing inconsistencies in the injury in fact prong).
251. Zemelnan, supra note 73, at 195; see also supra notes 82-83 (describing
restrictions on class actions).
252. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (discussing judicial nar-
rowing of Title VII).
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The judiciary, however, has clearly not overenforced Title
VII. Indeed, in certain areas, most notably entry-level hiring,
courts have dramatically underenforced the law.253 Because of
the particular nature of the entry-level employment search, 254
testers come well equipped to ferret out discriminatory conduct
that goes otherwise undetected. Testers can identify discrimina-
tion particularly well in a referral situation where a discriminat-
ing employer may erect yet another barrier to detection of its
practices. Furthermore, Congress has repeatedly signified its
intention to eliminate employment discrimination in all its ves-
tiges.255 Because enforcement by testers falls within the ambit
of both Title VII and § 1981, courts should therefore recognize
standing in such cases.
C. STANDING INQUIRY MUST EXPLICITLY ACCOUNT FOR THE
PoLIcms IMPLICATED
Courts must recognize the value and place of public model
litigation. Standing inquiries pitched in ostensibly neutral
terms but framed to exclude public model arguments are simply
unacceptable. Although structurally-minded legislation raises
genuine questions about the role of the judiciary in the modern
state, society comes no closer to answers by avoiding discussion
of the questions. Rather, courts must explicitly address the is-
sues implicated in a given standing question.
One Supreme Court Justice described standing as a "word
game played by secret rules."256 Courts should make these rules
clear. The judiciary needs a gate-keeping mechanism for its own
orderly operation as well as the maintenance of its separation
from other branches. Standing fulfills that function, but the in-
quiry must become an open one.
CONCLUSION
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals erred in denying employ-
ment testers standing under Title VII and § 1981 and in grant-
ing only limited standing to the sponsoring organization. The
FEC court mischaracterized the nature of the testers' claims,
253. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (discussing barriers to
suit in failure-to-hire cases).
254. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing judicial under-
enforcement in certain types of hiring cases).
255. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing congressional
intention that the court interpret Title VII broadly).
256. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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treating them as if they had alleged a loss of property interests.
The court's strict construction of civil rights laws conflicts with
their remedial purposes. The court's narrow definition of injury
and failure to consider the purposes of either Title VII or § 1981
represent an unfortunate trend. By viewing public wrongs
through the lens of a private litigation model, courts eliminate
the structural aspect of remedial legislation and undermine con-
gressional intent. Courts should not twist the standing inquiry,
which exists to ensure that courts confine themselves to their
proper role, to fit the private litigation model. Under an analy-
sis that accounts for congressional policies and justiciability val-
ues, tester standing becomes clear. It is time for a standing
doctrine that openly addresses the issues and policies at stake.

